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AS a result of the order of the Federal Fuel Administrator, The New Republic, which heretofore has closed its forms on Tuesday night, will now close a day later. Subscribers' copies, during the next eight weeks, will be mailed on Friday and Saturday instead of on Thursday and Friday. The serious congestion of second class mail matter which has existed for some weeks past at the post office terminals in New York, and the lack of adequate transportation, will probably further delay delivery of the paper. We regret these delays and hope our readers will recognize they are unavoidable.

FOR reasons which are stated elsewhere in this issue a clash between Congress and the President would wholly be deplorable at the present critical moment, but if the Senate insists on pressing the bill for a War Council in spite of the President's opposition, Mr. Wilson will have a much better claim on the support of all good citizens than have his adversaries. The President's objections to the kind of War Council proposed in the Chamberlain bill are well founded. It would be a more than doubtful expedient, even if the President and his Cabinet welcomed the innovation. But if the President and his Cabinet are opposed, it could only constitute an absurd and monstrous embarrassment to the successful operation of the national Executive. This objection to the bill is so unanswerable that if the bill is pressed by Senator Chamberlain and his Republican associates they will unmistakably give themselves away. They will be betraying a manifest purpose, not to speed up war preparations, but to convert into immediate political capital for Mr. Wilson's opponents the failings of the Wilson administration. To force a fight on the President for such a purpose would be the act of politicians who are ready to betray their country for the satisfaction of their own personal and partisan animosities.

THERE is only one possible way of speeding up war preparations, which is to exhaust every means of working with the President rather than against him. His constitutional position during war as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy and as the only possible vehicle of executive power is impregnable. Nothing useful can be done in administrative reorganization save with his consent and coöperation. He himself is, we believe, committing a grave mistake in not advancing to meet more half way those members of Congress who are only seeking to institute a general staff, without which no Commander-in-Chief, whether military or industrial, can plan a successful war, but if he is making a mistake Congress cannot and should not force a correction on him. What it can do is to continue its investigations, keep public opinion supplied with all the facts about the conduct of the war which are safe to print, and try persistently to modify any proposed legislation until the President

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withdraws his objection. That is the practical and public-spirited method of speeding up war preparations. In our opinion it would work better than at first sight appears probable. The existing mechanism will continue to creak, and groan and exasperate its victims, and the President himself will eventually be obliged to propose a different and better method of improving the war organization. He cannot persist in standing pat unless there is a substantial and wholly improbable turn for the better in the results of his war management. Such a policy is the only one which has any chance of success, and if it is adopted it will neither divide the nation on a purely domestic issue in the face of its enemy, nor will it enable the administration to escape the consequences of any mistakes, which it may or may not be committing.

SENATOR CHAMBERLAIN'S war bill for a War Council is a crude, ill considered and indefensible measure. Instead of providing some machinery of executive deliberation which would relieve the overworked President and federate the existing administrative principalities, it would merely embarrass the President and deprive the departmental chiefs of effective responsibility. Congress cannot insist on a War Council, which would emasculate the Presidency and supersede the cabinet. If it really wants to assist rather than hamper Mr. Wilson it will aim at the transformation of the cabinet from a body of departmental chiefs into a body of counselors, each of whom would represent some important executive department. Such a transformation would demand a council consisting of the cabinet members and the administrators of the several war services, such as Mr. Hoover and Mr. Hurley. The council would meet every day with the President as presiding officer; it would decide all questions of executive policy; and it would be supplied with all the information indispensable to its work by a staff of special investigators and accounting engineers. In order that the cabinet officers and administrators could find time for their work as counselors, under-secretaries would have to be provided in the several offices, who would relieve their chiefs of a part of the departmental detail on which they now spend so much of their time. A council of this kind might really relieve the President of some of his intolerable burden of responsibility and work, while at the same time providing the separate war administration with a well informed and capable general staff.

EXACTLY how serious the reported Austrian labor disturbances are we shall probably not know until after the war. Perhaps they are actually impairing the fighting capacity of the Dual Empire, and perhaps they are nothing more than a demonstration of political feeling, not intended seriously to handicap industrial operations. In any event, they are significant of a national awakening from fatal dreams of imperial grandeur. The Austrian people must now be revolving the question, What had we to expect from the war? The project of a Central European economic unit, with a sphere of influence extending to the Persian Gulf, may have promised great profits to the captains of industry of Germany, and possibly incidental gains to the German factory workers. It may have promised power and riches to the upper classes of Austria and Hungary, who no doubt were assured in advance of their share of the spoils. It promised nothing to the industry of the Dual Empire, whose most redoubtable competitor is the industry of Germany. Accordingly, it is not matter for surprise if the voice of the Austrian working classes is heard insisting that the war shall end at the earliest possible moment. They have suffered terribly, fighting not for themselves, but for Germany. What they are fighting for now is not the integrity of their own empire, it is for the military prestige of Germany.

EVERYBODY is familiar with Colonel Roosevelt's opinion of the man who wants to arbitrate when some one slaps his wife's face, and with its application to the politics of the world. Perhaps a little too familiar. The illustration, however fresh it looked at its first appearance, could not stay quite fresh through so many repetitions. Perhaps Colonel Roosevelt himself has become aware that even his words may grow old. Anyway, he has sent his illustration to the cleaner's, had it blocked over and rejuvenated, and offers it again in its newness. Here it is in its latest shape: "That species of internationalism which insists upon loving other countries as well as one's own stands upon the level of that species of conjugal affection which finds expression in loving another woman as well as one's own wife; each is a crime." Nothing old about this, please observe, except one's own wife. The other woman is new. Had the Colonel's sentence been spoken long enough ago it might have altered the whole life of more than one famous man. Perhaps Nelson would have given up Lady Hamilton sooner than be suspected of loving another country as well as England. And the ancient Jews, struck by this likeness between internationalism and discursive conjugal affection, might have summoned Solomon to choose between abdicating in favor of a monogamous nationalist and getting rid of about two hundred and ninety-nine wives.

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IN resigning from the cabinet before the report of the Irish convention Sir Edward Carson raises the banner of Ulster once again. Had he remained in the cabinet he might have found himself forced to act as a Briton rather than an Ulsterman, adopting recommendations from the Irish convention that his Ulster would not accept. That difficulty he avoids by resigning, and he also gives Orange Ulster a leader in case the government should overlook the deadlock of 1914. It has appeared for a while that the onus of refusing a settlement would be thrown entirely on Sinn Fein. Only extraordinary leadership on the part of Sir Edward Carson can now give Orange Ulster the position of seeking the agreement which Sinn Fein disowned in advance. With Ulster refusing to agree, and Sinn Fein refusing to agree, the convention will be a dead failure, and the situation will be squarely up to Lloyd George and his government to handle in a different manner. A frank acceptance of constitutional responsibility seems the only way to lift Ireland out of an endless muddle, with a complete avoidance of the legal barbarism that executed Roger Casement for treason but with an equal avoidance of the flaccid policy that encouraged Sir Edward Carson to believe that he can be treasonable when it so happens to suit him.

IS the Central European project breaking up before our eyes? For months Hungary has been advertising the fact that her only ambition is an honorable peace, without annexations or indemnities. She is sick of the war. So also is Austria. Bulgaria, according to the apparently authentic reports, is also sick of it. She has hailed President Wilson's formulation of war aims with something like enthusiasm. She wants more territory, to be sure, than she can legitimately claim, but she is no longer interested in world economic units in which she would represent a wretched minority interest. As for Turkey, large ambitions have been pretty completely whipped out of her. At the outset of the war she expected to recover Egypt and perhaps her nominal suzerainty over the rest of North Africa. She would now accept gladly a peace that would leave her nothing more than a nominal suzerainty over Arabia, Mesopotamia and Syria. The scheme of Central European unity was never espoused by the peoples, but by small political cliques, who will have enough to do after the war to retain the substance of domestic control over the peoples whom their ambitions have dragged through fruitless agonies. There may still be vitality in the scheme, but there is not enough in it to withstand to the end the continued assaults of Allied arms and diplomacy.

The Red Flag of Danger

THE critical moment has arrived in the development of American organization for the conduct of the war. Upon the action taken by Congress and the President during the next few weeks will depend both the military and economic efficiency of the American nation during the remainder of the hostilities and the unanimity and enthusiasm with which the government will hereafter be supported. Both the President and Congress stand at the parting of the ways. If they can agree upon a desirable measure of reorganization which will provide an effective remedy for the backwardness and blundering that have been uncovered in American military preparations, it will still be possible to recover the effective coöperation between the legislature and the executive which is indispensable to the energy and success of American military policy. But if they both prove to be unyielding, if Congress insists on its own plan of reorganization, irrespective of the President's wishes, and if the President stands pat on the whole matter of administrative reconstruction, the results may well be disastrous. The nation will be torn by civil strife at the very moment when it most needs to be united, and the success of American war preparation and the future of those salutary principles in domestic and foreign policies, of which Mr. Wilson is without a doubt the greatest living spokesman, will be seriously and unnecessarily compromised.

The President will be making a great mistake in attributing the demand for changes in the administration of the war chiefly to his personal enemies. The morale of a democratic nation during war depends in part upon the justice and the popularity of the cause for which the nation is fighting, and in part upon the confidence of the country in the management of the industrial and military enterprise. President Wilson has defined for his fellow-citizens a cause which even his most embittered critics have only furtively opposed, and for which the nation can be depended on to fight until success is achieved. But he has failed as yet to create an organization of the war services in which his fellow-countrymen feel confidence or have reason to feel confidence. The drastic, costly, yet ineffective measure with which Fuel Administrator Garfield has attempted to replenish coal supplies and relieve the congestion in the movement of freight, coming as it did on the top of the damaging public investigation into the War Department, has possessed American public opinion with serious misgivings. It has reason to fear that the huge resources, placed by Congress at the disposal of the administration, have not been converted as quickly

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and as effectively as they should into economic and military weapons dangerous to Germany. They will not count, as they could and should have been made to count, during the campaign of 1918, which there is every reason to believe will be the decisive campaign of the war. This fear is being steadily communicated to a larger number of people and is increasing in its exigency. If the United States were ruled by a Cabinet responsible to Congress the existing government would be superseded. The apprehension of the public and its demand for a speeding up of the preparation for war would have to be placated by a new group of executive officials selected particularly for the purpose of giving unity to the organization of the war and more energy to its prosecution.

This fact imposes on President Wilson a peculiarly burdensome responsibility. It rests primarily with him whether the country will or will not be extricated with a minimum of damage from the dangerous consequences of the first serious domestic crisis of the war. If he positively refuses either to order any major changes in the personnel of his administration or to consider any of the proposed plans of reorganization, he will be acting wholly within his legal rights. But he himself must realize how disastrous it might be to stand inflexibly on his legal independence of Congressional control. In that event, for the first time since the beginning of his Presidential career, he would be dividing himself from the better public opinion of the country. He would be leaving himself and his assistants defenseless against their enemies in case the conduct of the war was embarrassed by further serious difficulties. He would be jeopardizing his own personal prestige in this country and abroad and his own future power of moral leadership. A President's ability to assert his independence of Congress depends upon the popular support which he can command. Mr. Wilson should realize that, if he inflexibly opposes the Congressional pressure for reorganization, he will be inviting civil strife and encouraging the growth of a body of public opinion dangerously hostile to himself.

The predicament in which the President finds himself is peculiarly significant for the student of American political processes, because Mr. Wilson's tactics have been designed particularly for the purpose of avoiding breaks with Congress and public opinion. He has recognized the danger for an American president of alienating Congress or of getting either too far ahead or too far behind public opinion. In practice this waiting attitude involved a patient and sometimes an apparently procrastinating handling of specific economic and political situations and problems. He has allowed the full complexities and difficulties of a situation to develop before irrevocably committing himself and the country to a particular policy, because by so doing he expected to meet with fewer obstacles and less opposition in securing the acceptance of his decision. He has applied this method to all the newer and more serious questions of domestic and foreign policy which have come up during his two administrations, and while the practice has brought upon him much criticism from more impatient and less flexible minds, it has usually been successful in its chief purpose—that of creating a relation of mutual confidence between himself and a majority of the American people. His Fabianism frequently plunged him into difficulties, such as those in Mexico, from which he could extricate himself only with loss, but on the whole it has been a source of strength rather than of weakness. Fabianism is an essential ingredient of democratic statesmanship, and whenever, as sometimes happened, Mr. Wilson's deliberation tended to degenerate into procrastination he realized his danger in time and succeeded in making a sufficiently quick recovery.

In the task, however, of organizing his country for war he has carried his Fabian tactics too far. His initial program, including as it did the selective draft, government control over food and raw materials, abundant appropriations for equipments and munitions, and generous special provisions for shipbuilding and aviation was comprehensive and adequate. But it needed resourceful, energetic and skilful execution. In arranging for its execution he was quite right in testing out the existing organization first, and in avoiding drastic changes until he could supplement foreign with American experience and adjust the lessons of France and Great Britain to American administrative institutions. But, unfortunately, he has ignored foreign experience and neither he nor his chief assistants have recognized or studied the manifest defects in the existing organization which the first few months of war work revealed. As the summer passed into the fall and winter came on, it became apparent that the war administration was wasteful of time and energy in reaching decisions and slow and gravely deficient in its ability to secure results. The original program was not being executed promptly and no sufficient attempt was being made to investigate the reason for the delay and to provide a sufficient remedy. Every change in organization was adopted reluctantly, and none of them dealt with the fundamental difficulty of securing a satisfactory relationship between those who planned executive policies and those who carried them out.

For many months the present crisis has been coming to a head. The delay in reaching important decisions about the distribution of fuel, about the

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building of dwellings for the labor in the new industries, the assumption of national control over the railroads, and the organization needed to purchase supplies and secure the necessary labor has been gradually paralyzing both the civil and the military activities of the nation. Mr. Garfield's drastic order called attention to the ensuing crisis without providing any solution. The holidays are intended to crash through, at a huge expense, the most formidable of the immediate obstacles to the smooth operation of American war machinery. But, even if they succeed in doing this, other obstacles equally troublesome are looming in the distance. The President, Congress and the country should regard the existing breakdown as the red flag of danger. It should be a warning to the American people of the indiscriminate ruthlessness of war and of the kind of sacrifices which they will have to undergo before it can be brought to a successful conclusion. It should be a warning to Congress of the disastrous consequences of trying to make political capital out of national calamities. It should be a warning to the President of the impossibility during war of seeking to accommodate the American public to the need of drastic changes and sacrifices by allowing such crises to gather and to break. Instead of keeping the confidence of the country and avoiding drastic remedies, he is rendering himself vulnerable to the attacks of his enemies, he is jeopardizing his own popularity, and he is necessitating the use of remedies which in addition to being harsh and exasperating will ameliorate symptoms rather than effect a cure. Unless something is done to safeguard American business from a repetition of such congestive chills, and unless public opinion is assured of a plan of military and civil preparation which is more forehanded and more vigorous, the chills are likely to be succeeded by a fever whose consequences will be still more enervating.

When Congress proposes plans for reorganizing the war administration it is only reflecting the opinion of a majority of the American people. Mr. Wilson will be falling into the first grave mistake of his career if he permits his opponents to crowd him into the position of ignoring facts, of resenting criticism, and of rigidly opposing reorganization. That was the mistake which Mr. Asquith made in the spring of 1915, and it cost himself and his country dear. The President's personal and partisan enemies are making use of the crisis in order to force on him, if possible, a mechanism of war administration which would tend to hamper rather than to help him and his Cabinet, and which could only add to the existing confusion. He is justified in opposing this particular bill. But if he fails to recognize the necessity of some measure of reorganization which will make in favor of a more unified war administration and a more vigorous conduct of civil and military preparations, he will be misjudging the needs and opinions of the nation and failing to meet his own obligation to satisfy them. There is still time and space in which to deliver himself and the country from the deplorable consequence of a fight in the midst of war between the executive and legislative branches of the government. He can still offer as a substitute for the doubtful plan of reorganization, proposed in the Senate bill, a plan of his own which would be better designed to secure a similar result. If he would only adopt this course he would not only break the force of the attack of his enemies, and enable his friends to continue their undivided support, but he would do away with the most formidable threat which has yet been directed against the war morale of the American nation.

The Deeper Malady

FOR the moment we are suffering under an economic breakdown which painfully reminds us that a wound need not be as deep as a well nor as wide as a church door; a pin prick will do.

For this sudden crashing we have roundly blamed our bewildered Dr. Garfield. Quite properly blamed him, for he has displayed an infirm judgment, an unstatistical optimism and an inability not only to make the right decision, but to decide at all—until events removed decision from him. His windowless looking-glass house has now come down about his head. But in all this neither Dr. Garfield nor President Wilson is wholly at fault. The malady lies deeper than mere inefficiency and it affects our whole people. The present breakdown proves that our whole industrial system labors under a chronic inherent defect, not of the body, but of the brain.

That defect is the general unwillingness to view the industries and resources of the nation as a single unit. No other country has so wide a base in natural resources and none has a greater resource in labor and organizing ability. It is our theoretical foundation alone that is too narrow. We are hampered in peace and war not by poverty, native inefficiency or indifference, but by a wrong economic ideal, a stubborn, false conception that clogs our brains and paralyzes our actions. Our workless Mondays, with their smokeless factories and idle and bored citizens, are the result of looking upon the nation's industry as so many businesses, each making so much profit, and upon the national income as a mere summation of these individual incomes. As a consequence we are allowing our

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industry to follow the lead of profit seeking, are wasting our labor and our natural resources, are producing articles that we should not produce and not producing articles that we should produce. We are working under high pressure, but at low speed.

Here is the situation.

We are not putting our whole strength into the war. We have failed to build ships fast enough, to build aeroplanes fast enough, to mine enough coal, to put our railroads in good condition, to raise enough food (as well as to save enough food). We have failed to use our full resources of labor. Not only have we alienated thousands of workers through crass stupidity and indifference, but we have wasted many hundreds of thousands of others in all sorts of non-essential production. Men who might have been employed at growing foodstuffs, mining coal, repairing engines, are being used to build pleasure automobiles (of which we already have more than four times as many as all the rest of the world put together). They have been employed to brew more beer than we need and to manufacture excessive amounts of candy, toys, table glass-ware, pottery, athletic goods, jewelry, silverware, electric signs and other commodities. We are wasting labor and coal and railroad transportation to manufacture paper upon which to print advertisements with which to advertise articles which ought not to be produced and ought not to be sold. We are using our resources to create goods that we do not need, with the result that we cannot create goods that we do need. We are like a beggar who goes without food to buy himself a silk hat.

Why do we do this patently foolish thing? Obviously because we are not looking at the problem as it concerns the nation as a unit, but only as it individually affects each of the hundreds of thousands of separate businesses which make up our national industry. We have been assuming that if it pays John Smith to raise hot-house grapes it pays the nation. But in war time, and in times of peace also, whether a business is worth conducting depends not on the profits or wages it pays, but upon whether that business provides the best way of utilizing the nation's labor and raw materials. We have just so much of this labor and of these materials to go around and we must make the most of them. Nor can we draw upon the future; we must fight this war and run our industries with the actual present-day labor and the actual present-day materials. We cannot man the trenches with unborn children who will be ready twenty years from now, and we cannot export to our soldiers in France wheat to be grown next year. Whether we finance the war by loans or taxes, the actual goods consumed and labor expended come from our present supply, from the identical supply out of which are drawn the men who are making bracelets and Indian clubs and pleasure automobiles. We must make our choice. The more labor we use for non-essential industries the less we shall have to help our Allies and our own troops. And what applies to labor applies equally to coal and transportation.

If we are in earnest about winning the war we must establish a definite priority in these matters. Absolutely essential are all goods required by our army and the armies of our Allies, and for the health and efficiency of our own civil population and the civil populations of our Allies. If French morale breaks down because of lack of coal which we might have shipped we shall have paid dearly for our toys and athletic goods. After these absolutely essential commodities comes a series of goods in a declining scale of exigency, from articles that are almost but not quite requisite down to those which are useless or indeed actually harmful. We need not fear that we shall be too rigidly ascetic in these determinations. We shall not cut off all comforts and pleasures; if we did we should be cutting off essentials.

In only one way can we properly establish this priority of essential over non-essential production. That way is by concrete, well considered government action, taken after consultation with all interests involved, and carried out gradually but with absolute certitude. Suddenly to deny coal or railroad transportation to industries which are to be discriminated against is a bad method of accomplishing the result. It is equally vicious to urge the non-consumption of luxuries, without making provision for the labor and capital thus automatically squeezed out. All spasmodic, irregular and unheralded action is needlessly cruel. Nor can we leave the matter to private initiative, to the uninstructed conscience of the employer to the law of supply and demand. If we thus abdicate our right of intelligent decision we shall have labor used up in the production of needless pleasure cars while not enough can be had for the mining of coal or the cobbling of shoes. The rich will buy away from the poor and from our Allies the labor needed to produce essentials and will devote that labor to the production of pleasant non-essentials. Unless we consider our national production as a single gigantic factory and run it as such, and unless we regulate our consumption by a consciously directed limitation of production we shall develop friction and secure only a part of the saving that is possible.

In seeking to do this we shall meet with much well intentioned and disinterested opposition. It will be argued in the first instance that our real problem is not to save, but rather to increase and energize, our labor.

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Undoubtedly we can make labor more ample and efficient. We can take up the slack, employ men who are today unemployed and employ those regularly who are only partially employed. We can work harder, longer, more intensely, more efficiently and can use better organization and better machinery. By treating labor fairly and by deporting fewer workers and imprisoning fewer labor "agitators," we can eliminate much friction and prevent what the I. W. W. leaders call the "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency." Further we can draw upon the immense field of woman labor, which we utilize less than does any other industrial nation. Should we do all of this, however, we should still not have advanced the solution if with each addition to labor we also increased our non-essential production. We should merely have more unnecessary goods at the expense of more toil. There would be a still more acute demand for automobiles, glassware, pottery and carpets; and the same and possibly even a greater difficulty in securing men to grow food, dig coal, build ships and run railroads. Undoubtedly we must increase the supply and the efficiency of labor to a point where the marginal product obtained will be worth more to the nation than the cost of the marginal expenditure of labor, but step by step with this increase of labor must go a decrease of non-essential production. In actual conditions, with an unlimited demand for ships, coal, food, transportation and munitions, and with the necessity of sending ever larger armies to France, we must not only increase the amount and efficiency of labor, but also increase the relative share of that labor devoted to the production of essentials.

But, it is further objected, if we are to pay taxes and subscribe to Liberty loans, we must keep our industries going, for the war must be paid for out of production. But curtailing or totally eliminating non-essential industries does not lessen output, but merely changes its character, diverting energies from less to more useful production. It would be useless to stop the manufacture of pleasure automobiles if the labor, coal, copper and transportation facilities thereby released were not utilized for some other production. To cut off non-essential industries does not reduce the total national product, but merely improves its character.

Exactly the same answer must be made to the argument that to curtail non-essential production would throw men out of employment. No plan of limitation could have any hope of success unless the men released from one industry were re-employed in others. There is room for all this labor.

All that is necessary is to apply prevision, good judgment and wise administration to a difficult problem. In the first place, decisions should not be sudden and unexpected. No industry should be deemed non-essential until it has presented its case, and if the decision is adverse, it should be permitted to formulate plans by which its discontinuance or transformation might be made gradual and painless. Experts should study the best methods of utilizing the plants rendered vacant and this study should be completed weeks in advance of any overt action. Nor can the government assume that labor is perfectly mobile and can be counted upon to move automatically to the place and industry where it is most needed. Guidance and assistance are required. The administrators responsible for the elimination of non-essential industries should also coöperate on the enormously intricate and complex task of re-employing the workers. It should, when necessary, secure jobs for displaced men at wages approximately equal to their former wages, and the government could even afford to make up for any such deficiency in earnings. For those permanently unemployed as a result of the elimination of an industry, some temporary compensation might well be offered.

To carry out such a vast though gradual reorganization at haphazard and unscientifically, without a conception of the relations existing between industries, would be ruinous. To carry out the plan without consultation with the best minds would lead the Government into inextricable difficulties and contradictions. It would be equally futile if we were to make ultra-rapid and unexpected decisions, like the recent Garfield prohibition, which in essence was really a clumsy attempt to discriminate against non-essential industries. The restriction or elimination should be gradual. For example, if eight months ago it had been decided to reduce the manufacture of pleasure automobiles ten per cent monthly, and if at the same time plans had been formulated gradually to absorb the machinery and labor thus released we should have had a far easier transition than any we are now likely to see. A machinist to be discharged in December would have been warned in May, and either he or the government would have had ample time to find him a new and equally remunerative position. Exactly the same method might have been applied to the plants, machinery and other capital, not only of this business but of all others. But we did not do this. We were not ready. We are not ready today.

In a speech on Industrial Preparedness delivered in September, 1916, Secretary Baker said: "In one of the great factories in Germany, two hours after the war was declared, one-half of the operatives were on the way to the front. The other half had turned aside from the manufacture of optical instruments and were actually engaged in the opera-

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tion of making war supplies for the German army."

We in America have been at war much longer than two hours. We went to war without any real conception as to what our military effort would mean to us economically, and even today we do not fully grasp that relation. We still seem to believe that we can in large measure permit laissez faire and the rule of profits to determine our industrial situation in war as in peace, and where we have dethroned laissez faire we have set up the rule of inexpertness. We still half-believe in " business as usual," " profits as usual," " waste as usual," and we consider our war industries as a something merely added to our ordinary production. We are trying to force water into a jar filled with mercury and we wonder why the water does not stay in. But sooner or later our bitter experience will teach us, and we shall be forced to accept the theory which Germany accepted before the war and to formulate plans like those which Germany had prepared in detail years and years before her fatal ultimatum to Russia.

The Third Obligation

THE United States promised the Allies ships, men and food. The ships are late, the army is late. Meanwhile the world food shortage is increasing, and upon our 1918 crop will fall a demand whose extent and pressure is now scarcely understood. Shall we be ready? The excuse for delay in ships and armies is that America had to make these things anew. But no other country is so well prepared to grow and export a food surplus. America's task is not, like Germany's, to expand food resources two or three times. It is to increase them ten or fifteen per cent above normal. Yet present indications are that many of the 1918 crops will not be above and some may be actually below normal. There are not six weeks before planting begins. Unless strong and quick action is taken, the efforts of America to help the Allies are likely to be rewarded by a crowning humiliation.

Natural causes have contributed. Winter wheat has been a disappointment, on account of the weather. Early frost prevented the maturing of much seed corn, and the germinating power of many local supplies of seed which matured is likely to be low. Other seed stocks are short. The drouth in the Southwest brought about crop shortages and distress, and similar conditions have existed in the Dakotas and Montana. These natural misfortunes have been aggravated by artificial difficulties. The farms are very short of labor; it is estimated that over two million trained laborers have been lost to them on account of the drain to industries and the draft. Farm machinery is scarce and the prices are high. And, finally, the rapidly increasing numbers of tenant farmers are unable to borrow money to overcome these difficulties, since loans cannot be obtained through the Federal Farm Loan system without security. In Texas alone over two million people live in the drouth district, and at least forty-four per cent of them are tenants. They have no collateral except work stock, household furniture and expectation of crops, and in 1917 crop failure thrust them deeply into debt. Unless immediate assistance comes to them, they will leave the land, or fail to work it except for their own sustenance. This is not an opportunity for private financial enterprise, it is an emergency to be met by a nation which must have food.

No single department of the government possesses sufficient power to alleviate the situation. The Department of Agriculture is supposed to " stimulate production," but it cannot furnish either labor or finance. Its machinery was originated largely for three functions: the gathering of information, the dissemination of information, and regulation. Moreover, its employees for years have been accustomed to an unspoken injunction to " go slow " or " let alone " certain basic questions. Now this habit of mind is difficult to overcome, and the process of re-education in a department of many thousand employees is not accomplished in so short a time.

The Food Administration is not permitted to influence production except through price incentive. Since Congress did not give it much power as to the determination and enforcement of minimum guaranties, even this help is limited. Of course it does do what it can to stabilize prices at points that will reawaken confidence in rural districts. As to hogs, beet sugar and canned vegetables, it has accomplished welcome and useful results. Its milk commissions are still wrestling with prices and they have taken a number of steps toward the stabilization of milk prices by districts.

The Department of Labor is now charged with a vast scheme for locating and clearing labor to the farms. The farmer views this project with a friendly scepticism. He does not see how able-bodied men can be induced to leave paying industries to work for him at lower wages under conditions less attractive. He knows that no armies of school boys, aged men, defective persons, and persons unskilled in farming can by their combined output enlarge the productive power of the farms of the nation from which so many trained workers have gone. He knows that this type of labor cannot produce results except under closest supervision. Moreover, he does not think that any rate of replacement of men on the farms can equal the drain

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upon the able-bodied by the draft and booming industrial occupations. It is help of a continuous character that he needs badly. So the farmer is making his plans to produce what he can. On thousands of farms curtailment plans are being made.

Farming, as the farmers know it, is a slow occupation that admits of long-time turn-overs only and requires foresight. The good farmer must work on at least a three-year plan. The shortest time that he can allow himself to obtain results is a crop season. He must be able to sustain a new venture for several years before his returns will begin to pay on his investment. If the farmer is asked to produce more beef, the shortest time it will require will be two years of work and waiting; if more hogs, at least ten months; if grain beyond his ordinary capacity, he must purchase expensive machinery and wait several years to compensate himself for outlay, during which time the depreciation on his investment proceeds with great rapidity.

These are some of the reasons why the farmer hesitates to respond to patriotic outbursts from city exhorters. He does his best with his facilities, but when his interest rates are higher for short-time productive credit than are those of his implement dealer in town, and when no assurance is given by the government that he will get back his production costs and a slight profit, he becomes doubtful and accepts with a grain of salt documents that tell him of the fine prospects, but which do not guarantee him against loss.

In the management of the war, with numbers of voluntary helpers in authoritative positions, representatives of the organized farmers are absent. To none of the war activities has there been attached, in a position of high responsibility, a representative of a single great national farm organization. In a memorial to the President, presented January 22nd, the Federal Board of Farm Organizations, embracing seven national farmers' associations, in conjunction with members of several state Granges and heads of the American Society of Equity, warned the government of the impending shortage, emphasizing this lack of representation in the conduct of the war, and asking for immediate steps to meet the crisis. In their memorial they do not ask for any class exemptions as to the draft, or any special consideration that has not been offered to other classes in the country.

Mere propaganda will not give the world food. Last year, under conditions better than we can hope to have this year, the farmers responded to the patriotic appeal. In many instances the response proved unprofitable. They must now have encouragement, and encouragement which does not say: "The world's need is your opportunity," but "Here is everything that the government can do to help you. Get the food for us." The government said to the ship builders: "We will advance you the money, help you get labor, buy your ships, and pay you a good profit." If we are to have crops we must say as much to the farmers. It will require additional power somewhere, a centralization of authority and responsibility. There are only six weeks before planting.

"Three Cheers for the Poor"

SO close was the margin by which the House of Representatives agreed to the federal woman suffrage amendment that those who are its advocates can afford to leave nothing undone that will strengthen their position for the next struggle. Before the measure comes up for a vote in the Senate a good deal of hard work needs to be done. Suffragists can profitably examine the weaknesses disclosed in their case by the debate which the House has already given to the measure.

Something should be done, in the first place, to prepare a better answer to the objection that came up most frequently in the House. This was the objection made on psychological grounds. "I will not debate the question as to whether in a time of war women are the best judges of policy," said Mr. Parker of New Jersey. "That great student of human nature, William Shakespeare, in the play of Macbeth, makes Lady Macbeth eager for deeds of blood until they are committed and war is begun, and then just as eager that it may be stopped—while the man, as man should be, is slow to enter into a quarrel, but, being in, knows that he must so bear himself that his opponents may beware of him."

Close on the heels of this first objection comes a second, also intimately at one with the nation's self-preservation. A country must have a population, obviously, if it is to keep its place in world society. "If, after the war is over," declared Mr. Gray, "woman is not free to have children, to establish and reëstablish and maintain the home, without any thought of political equality with man, but with a firm reliance upon man as her God-given protector and champion, then you will have to confess that your civilization is a failure and that God and nature both erred in their scheme of things. And that is another reason why I am opposed to the pending amendment."

From the rights of nations to the rights of states is a short jump. Mr. Small, of North Carolina, furnished the third criticism of woman suffrage. "The proposition substantially resolves itself into this question: Shall we preserve in the states unrestricted jurisdiction over those subjects

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which are internal, and which have always been recognized as inherently embraced among the rights of local self-government?" This is a clear argument, and it must be admitted that it carried a good deal of force. It might have carried even more, perhaps, had it not been that Mr. Small happens to be Chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee, and, in this position, disturbs the states' "unrestricted jurisdiction over subjects which are internal" to the extent of some twenty million dollars annually.

Less easy to discredit is the argument of those Congressmen who voted against woman suffrage, but were opposed to it for no reason in particular. Mr. Moon, of Tennessee, was such an opponent. He began his address by declaring: "Logically, no man can deny that a woman is entitled to all the rights and privileges, including the right of suffrage, that men enjoy; nor has man the moral right to determine whether it is best for women to exercise the right to vote or not. Women should be permitted to determine for themselves that which they think is best for them." That was his beginning. This, ten minutes later, was his conclusion: "Patriotism, in my judgment, forbids the injection of this issue into national politics at this time. This is not the hour for any honest American or patriot to press this issue upon the people."

A good deal of attention was given to the disturbances that woman suffrage might effect in the ordinary stream of life. Such disturbances are at all times to be regretted. In a time of war, with trouble enough outside the door, they are particularly unhappy. Should there be political disagreement in a family, Mr. Clark of Florida declared, "we would find the husband and wife constantly engaged in political disputation, which would grow warmer, more heated, and more acrimonious as the campaign advanced, until finally a veritable conflagration of domestic infelicity would be kindled, consuming the marital tie, destroying the home, and sending the children, to all intents and purposes, orphans out on the cold charity of the world to become charges of the state."

At this point Mr. Clark asks himself a rhetorical question: "But, say some, 'You are speaking only of the women who are married; what of those who are not married?'"

This looks like a stickler. But Mr. Clark is ready for it. "Mr. Speaker," he says, "I am speaking of those who are married, and I think this question ought to be settled with relation to its effect upon the married women of the land, because that is the relation nature intended for them. . . . The Creator of us all intended that men and women should mate—one woman for one man is the law of God—and the law of all enlightened Christian people everywhere. . . . Why, then, should we make a general law to fit the case or suit the convenience or cater to the whim of a few exceptions to the general class of women?"

The final objection to woman suffrage it was again Mr. Clark's lot to supply. "Mr. Speaker," he declared, "before I will believe that the American woman, contented and happy in the love of her husband and children, desires to exchange her proud estate for the poor privilege of dragging her skirts through the mud and mire of partisan politics, I must have indisputable proof."

There was a good deal of comment on the aloofness of women from the mud and mire in which these Congressmen themselves were wallowing, enough to remind one, as it reminded Mr. Decker, of the banquet of prosperous exporters in New York, who ate and drank until the small hours of the morning. Before the affair was closed one of the gentlemen arose and said: "Mr. Toastmaster, as we sat here around this table spread with the good things of life, all we could eat and all we could drink, my heart went out to the poor people of New York City, the women who have not enough clothing, the children who have not shoes to wear or books with which to go to school, and I move you, Mr. Toastmaster, that we now rise and give three cheers for the poor."

That was the way with one hundred and thirty odd members of the House of Representatives. All through the debate they protested their reverence and devotion. Woman was a "ministering angel," "God's noblest creation," "man's better counterpart," "humanity's perennial hope." But when it came to giving her a vital thing—the ballot—these Congressmen, like the prosperous exporters, were ready to rise and give three cheers for the poor.

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Pursuing Mr. Baker

I LIE now by the roadside and watch Mr. Baker coursing happily across the next field ahead in all that splendid new fur called "*functional* reorganization" in the War Department, and I turn and look back in despair at all the other "organizations" and "reorganizations" with which Mr. Baker has diverted and baffled his pursuers ever since the war began.

Last April, in company with virtually every other moderately humble and moderately teachable person in the United States, I said that in order to get munitions fast it was necessary to have a civilian-headed, single-headed new munitions organization, as in France and in England. Mr. Baker did not seem to think so. However, we pursued him and caught up with him and he said, in effect:

"Wait! Civilians? I am chairman of the Council of National Defense and I have authorized the members of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense to appoint all the civilians in the United States to be members of committees to advise them and to advise me. I am about to make, I am now making, the greatest known recorded use of civilians. This is a great country. Give me a chance."

What could we do? This is indeed a great country. We all sat down and wrote little articles saying that this is a great country and that no other country had ever invented anything quite like those committees belonging to the Advisory Commission —which was quite true. And we tied a handkerchief about our eyes and gave Mr. Baker a sporting head-start. And then we took up the scent; and we ran; and, not without effort, we caught up with Mr. Baker's organization and examined its achievements; and they were not satisfactory; and Mr. Baker, in effect, admitted that they were not satisfactory; but he said, in effect:

"Wait! Just as you were coming over the crest of that last hill I invented another organization. Behold the 'General Munitions Board'! Those old committees reported to the Advisory Commission. This new 'General Munitions Board' reports to the Council of National Defense direct. This country has a genius of its own. And now we will begin again."

What could we do? We began again. We said that this country has a genius of its own and is three thousand miles wide, while you can go from London to Edinburgh in eight hours, though just what that fact has to do with the case is now not quite clear; and Mr. Baker took another head-start.

Again, however, after a sporting length of time had elapsed, we were upon him; and the achievements of his new organization were far from satisfactory; and this time we said that surely, after all, a principle which worked between London and Edinburgh would work between Washington and Pittsburgh and then between Pittsburgh and Indianapolis and then between Indianapolis and St. Louis, and so on in short dashes until it had covered a country three thousand miles wide; and we were prepared to find Mr. Baker beaten and apologetic and converted; but as we rounded the last hedgerow, there he stood, our old friend Br'er Baker, grinning from ear to ear and all dressed up in the "War Industries Board." And he said in effect: "Foiled again! I have changed the name of the 'General Munitions Board' to 'War Industries Board' and I have given it some new powers. You will understand what these new powers are if you will read this announcement, which I hand you, fifteen or sixteen times and if you will watch the operations of the 'War Industries Board' for three or four months. I have the honor, gentlemen, to wish you good morning, and it would hardly be fair or patriotic of you to do any hueing and crying after me till I am well out of sight."

For the third time, for the third important time, we lay by the roadside and watched Br'er Baker leaping jauntily into the distance in clothes of a cut never before worn by any minister of war on earth. We began to be a bit doubtful about these War-Department tailors whose chief recommendation for their wares appeared to be that they got out a new fashion every few months. Nevertheless, as seemed to be our duty, we said the best that could be said for the "War Industries Board," and the columns of The New Republic and of almost all other magazines and newspapers will bear this statement out, and we hoped against hope that the intricate and laborious idea of a "War Industries Board" "coördinating" the purchasing departments of the War Department would turn out to be an improvement on the perfectly simple and self-proved idea of a separate munitions ministry. And we did not resume our pursuit of Mr. Baker for quite a while.

When we took it up again (I speak now of newspaper and magazine correspondents), we were joined, soon, by gentlemen from the Senate; and these gentlemen were not merely alarmed, they were most of them appalled and even panic-stricken by what they discovered with regard to our prospects in such primary and indispensable matters as machine-guns and artillery; and we all ran; and Mr.

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Baker ran; and, just exactly as on every other similar occasion, Mr. Baker broke out at once into a lot of new protective colorings in the way of "organization" and "reorganization." In rapid succession he developed a "War Council" within his Department and a "*functional* reorganization" and a "Directorship of Purchases."

The question now is: Has Mr. Baker earned the right to another head-start? Surely the answer must be emphatically: No. When a man three times in succession has invented a strange and monstrously complicated system which three times in succession he has virtually abandoned, he has no right to any head-start whatsoever on his fourth. This time he should be compelled to open his arms to receive at once the one system which in a democracy is known to work well for the production of munitions, the system tested and triumphant at Paris and at London. Mr. Baker's new doings are nothing but new evasions of the central point of that system and new efforts to seem to be "reorganizing" the heart and brain of his Department when in reality he is only "reorganizing" its arms and legs.

His "War Council" I have already discussed in these columns. Consisting of military men who either have never been purchasers at all or else have ceased, for cause, to be permitted to be purchasers, it manifestly is no step forward whatsoever toward a civilian-headed, single-headed munitions organization.

His "*functional* reorganization" is an internal technical scientific management matter which has nothing to do with the one great principle at issue. If Mr. Smith lets a contract for blankets and then follows up the making of those blankets and inspects them as they are made, he is *not* working in a "*functional*" scheme. If the letting of the contracts is in the hands of Mr. Jones, and the following up of them in production is in the hands of Mr. Brown, and the inspecting of them is in the hands of Mr. Green, then they all of them *are* working in a "*functional*" scheme. You could have this "*functional*" way of doing things inside an organization which was essentially right at the top. You could have it inside an organization which was essentially wrong at the top. It is a detail, an important detail, but a detail. The big thing is the top. The big thing is to be right at the top. And Mr. Baker, in naming a "Director of Purchases," makes one more move, one more evasive move, one more pretended move, toward getting a right top.

He will have a "Director of Purchases," but of what sort? First, this Director is a military man and not a civilian. We shall have civilians still in the "War Industries Board," which will continue to exist. That will do for a pretence of civilian control. It is powerless, harmless, having no genuine executive authority; but it will do for window-dressing. And in the meantime the "Director of Purchases," sitting actually within the War Department while the "War Industries Board" is outside, will be a military man, bound by precisely the same sort of training which made the best military men in France and in England fail at precisely that same sort of job.

But, second, this military man will not be given even the power which those military men of France and of England enjoyed. They at any rate had a chance to succeed, so far as their power was concerned. This "Director of Purchases" of ours is modeled after the officials of the old Chinese Imperial Court. He has an overwhelming title and no real power at all. He is placed above General Wheeler of Ordnance and General Gorgas of Medicine and General Goethals of Quartermaster Stores and General Squier of Aircraft. Can he compel them? He cannot. You cannot compel people who derive their authority from somebody else and whom you cannot remove and replace no matter how much they flout you.

Ever since the beginning of the war we have been trying to get things done by putting people over other people whom they have no power to compel. We did it in the committees of the Advisory Commission. We did it in the General Munitions Board. We did it in the War Industries Board. And we reached a failure every time. And now Mr. Baker is doing it all over again in the Directorship of Purchases and is calling it reform. It is not reform. It is a repetition of a failure already several times repeated.

The gentlemen of the Senate might well say to Mr. Baker:

"If we ask you to resign or reorganize, we mean *really* reorganize. We do not mean give us a phantom of civilian-headed control in the War Industries Board. We do not mean give us a phantom of single-headed control in the Directorship of Purchases. Those controls are not controls, and we know that they are not controls, and you know that they are not controls. The only control worth talking about is executive control, control with power to hire and fire and compel. We want that kind of control, and we want it lodged in one man, and we want that one man a civilian. That system, that one-civilian-executive system, has worked. Your successive systems have not worked. Stop pretending to change. Change!"

Every man with liberal instincts must profoundly hope that Mr. Baker will consent to change, and will not drive on to final failure and resignation. His services to the cause of liberalism, in the matter,

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for instance, of labor, have been enormous. By adopting a reasonable and a friendly and a helpful attitude toward labor and toward labor-organizations in all the industries which are engaged in working for the War Department, he has done more than any other man in the United States to keep American labor fairly satisfied in its just claims and to keep it thoroughly solid, on the whole, for the war. Mr. Baker's labor policy is one of the chief reasons for our present national unity.

That unity is even more important, I am bound to say, than machine-guns. We cannot win without machine-guns, but we cannot even stay in the war without unity. If certain of Mr. Baker's critics were put in his place, they would outrage and alienate enough workingmen and enough other people to give us an anti-war majority in the next elections.

Mr. Baker's policy in the matter of labor and in the matter of the project for the immediate adoption of permanent universal military service and in many other matters has been a very great influence indeed in persuading the mass of the American people that this is a democratic war and not a militaristic war. It has been a very great influence indeed in persuading the mass of the American people to continue to support this war. It is an influence which, if possible, must be retained at Washington.

Mr. Baker should really be, like Lord Curzon, and like Lord Milner, in England, a " minister without portfolio." He is a statesman. He is a statesman with a deep insight into popular social feelings and with an absolutely sure touch in his dealings with those feelings. He is a statesman, and he should be given to statesmanship. He is not an administrator. At any rate, he persistently and perversely refuses to adopt the one central simple manifest principle of administration by which alone our greatest administrative task—the production of munitions and the organization of our war-industries—can be accomplished.

Why will he be so stubborn? Why will he not open his mouth and swallow that pill and appoint a genuine executive civilian Director of War Industries and stay in Washington and give to that Director and to all of us the continued immense and invaluable benefit of his liberal-minded social statesmanship?

WILLIAM HARD.

To Make the League of Nations Real

THE recent statement of war aims, first by Lloyd George and then by President Wilson, produced some of the effects which the advocates of open diplomacy have always claimed on its behalf. They reinforced the military and economic coöperation of the Allied governments with a larger measure of political and moral unity; and aided by the peace initiative of the Bolsheviki they have undoubtedly widened the breach between the pan-Germans and the socialists in Germany. So far so good, but it is not enough. Those whose chief preoccupation is to obtain some assurance of a better international order as a result of the sufferings and sacrifices of the war, now have to insist upon a final step, which, if it is adopted, will contribute still further to the cohesion of a group of sincerely liberal nations and to the disintegration of a group of essentially militarist nations. This further step consists in proving the sincerity of their belief in the idea underlying a League of Nations by doing what they can to bring it into existence now. This idea has since the beginning of the war obtained wide and increasing acceptance as an idea, but the time has now come when, if it is to live and thrive, it must be acted on as well as approved and discussed. In order to explain why action on behalf of the League of Nations has become necessary, we shall have to review the political history of the war, and thus to bring out the stage which has been reached in the evolution of the idea of a league of nations.

Early in the war the Allies were reluctant to state their war aims frankly because of a general disability of which the case of Italy is perhaps the best example. Italy was at that time cherishing aims which could have been interpreted as " imperialistic." The difficulty of stating them did not arise only from their imperialistic character but also from their partial conflict with claims of other Allies actual or prospective—Serbia and Greece. They did not altogether harmonize with the aspirations of the very subject peoples whose cause the Alliance was espousing, with the principle of nationality which has been proclaimed as the chief political boon for which the Allies fight.

Not only did such conflicts play a part in the failure to hold Russia to the Allied cause; it was mainly accountable for the military failure to establish the " single front." The conquest of the Dalmatian coast, for instance, was not an aim common to or in the interests of the whole Alliance; it was indeed opposed by some members of the Alliance. It was not indispensable to military defeat of the Central Powers; it was merely a special political object,

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cherished only by one member of the Alliance. The ultimate effect of its achievement would have been to weaken the Alliance as a whole, not to strengthen it. British and French soldiers could not be asked to die for an object quite special to Italy. The net result of such conflicts was to create in some degree an active agent of disintegration within the Alliance; in considerable degree a passive bar to concentration of effort by the whole group.

But the process of disintegration was not confined to encouragement of dissension among the separate states of the Alliance. It created cleavage among opposing elements within each state. What the existence of secret treaties, the reluctance to restate aims, refusals of passports for Stockholm, the promotion of the war by reactionary groups admittedly hostile to democracy, the increasing influence obtained by such groups during the war—what all this had done to Russia in the way of creating suspicion was also done in lesser degree by the same causes in Italy, and even in France and England. General Maurice, of the British General Staff, has in his report on the Italian reverses declared that revolutionary unrest behind the line must be counted a large factor therein.

What prompted the Allies to agree to such promises, Italy to exact them, a large element of Italian opinion to sustain the exaction and European opinion as a whole to sanction the principle of secrecy in treaty making? The answer is plain. It was the national instinct of self-preservation expressing itself in the only way in which it could express itself under the conditions of international anarchy which have hitherto prevailed in Europe, in the scramble for national power as the only sure foundation of national security.

In no country of the Allies would imperialist aims have had any chance of general sanction unless they were defended on grounds of the needs of national defense. Italian statesmen, for instance, seeing before them nothing but the old Europe of shifting Alliances; no hope of national defense save in Italy's own military and naval strength and strategic position, desired command of the Adriatic, and so needed possession of the Dalmatian coast. But for that, these Italian demands would not have been presented. Italy said in effect—" I have no defense but my power; I must have Dalmatia, stations in Asia Minor. I am sorry for Serbia, the southern Slavs, and the Greeks, but our national safety must come first." And the Allies, knowing that they had nothing tangible in the way of guaranties of future security except territory to offer Italy as payment for her coöperation, offered territory, notwithstanding the risks from the point of view of the present and future solidarity of the Alliance.

But we have not exhausted the cost of their undertaking. The same policy which inevitably creates conflicting " imperialist " claims within the Alliance, creates also a contrasting unity in bitter-end resistance on the part of the enemy. The same instinct for national self-preservation which disintegrates us, unites him. The implied admission that the political future of Europe holds nothing better than the old competition for power and territory justifies the enemy in fighting to the last for the preservation of all he now possesses. If the implied forecast is correct, Germany must remain preponderantly strong or perish.

A severely practical question is immediately suggested as the result of this analysis. Could any alternative policy on the part of the Allies have so satisfied the Italian instinct of national self-preservation as to have prevented an Italian imperialist program from obtaining general support by appeal to that instinct? There is only one alternative policy that could, given certain circumstances, have accomplished the desired result. If the Allies had been able to say to Italy, " We are determined to bring into existence a League of the Nations. There will be no reversion to the old scramble for a favorable balance of power, and you need have no anxieties about the naval command of the Adriatic, because hereafter our combined fleets will be at your disposal for defensive purposes."

Unfortunately, however, such an offer would not have satisfied Italy. It would not have brought her into the war, and it would not have been regarded as practical politics by any diplomat in Europe. An offer made in those terms would have been regarded as childish and derisory.

We have now reached an ultimate fact in respect to the standing of a League of Nations, which its advocates must frankly face. In order to secure the coöperation of a great European state in the defense of civilization against a great common menace, the Allies had to resort to the old method of territorial payment and secret bargaining. The mere suggestion of a League of Nations as a practical alternative creates instantly in one's mind, now in 1918, an impression of political unreality, amateurishness, Utopianism. We are driven consequently, to one startling conclusion; namely, that orthodox statesmanship did not take seriously in 1915, and does not today, the one policy above all others for which America is fighting. That should not surprise us, for in a sense Americans have not taken it seriously themselves. They have proposed the League of Nations as a general indication of objects, but no " general statement of principles " can be regarded as a policy until definite plans and methods for their application to concrete difficulties have been indicated.

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President Wilson has himself recognized, in other circumstances, that general statements in diplomatic negotiations are apt to be quite without value. The German autocracy has also declared itself in favor of a League of Nations, and not only in favor of it but ready to lead it; Austria is in favor of it; everybody is in favor of it, because nobody takes it seriously. M. Clemenceau is one of the few statesmen in Europe who has been frank enough to blurt out what so many are thinking, that the whole project is vague and nebulous and has not entered the region of practical politics. The most significant fact in connection with M. Clemenceau's declaration is that no one was particularly disconcerted by it. If ever the Allies, including this country—to say nothing of the enemy—had been taking Mr. Wilson's policy seriously, a statement like that of M. Clemenceau's made by an Allied prime minister on taking office would have created an immense sensation, an explosion. Little notice was taken of it. And if the Allied statesmen thus treat it, how can we ask the revolutionists in Russia, the Socialists in Italy, or in Germany, to take it seriously? Yet the policy so lightly dismissed by M. Clemenceau is the only possible alternative to the old competition for territory and power, which involves annexation of unwilling provinces, armament, militarism, secret diplomacy, and the frustration of democracy.

If this old order, particularly in view of the possibilities of the changed relationship of Russia to Germany, is to be reestablished after the war, America will have obtained nothing positive for which she is fighting—neither security from the menace of military aggression, nor the more efficient protection of small states, nor safety for her citizens in future wars against submarine attack; least of all a world safe for democracy. And yet America has no other aims. She can be compensated with no "unredeemed" territory, neither with Alsace-Lorraines, Trentinos, Mesopotamias, nor German colonies. America was brought into the war by motives which orthodox statecraft has heretofore regarded as practically inoperative; which it would have considered ridiculous, even, in regard to Italy.

American statesmanship is not, however, as helpless as this situation seems to indicate. It is perfectly true, given the political traditions, forces and circumstances of Europe in 1915, that nothing but compensations of the old territorial description would have brought Italy into the war. But two facts are now plain. The first is that persistence in the old policy, for all the reasons here summarized, can only end by smashing the Alliance. It has indeed by the defection of Russia already created a great breach in it. The second fact is that the traditions, forces and circumstances of Europe are no longer what they were, even at the beginning of the war. The Russian revolution is not only part of that change; it is a cause and sign of further change. Allied statesmanship can convert these profound changes into the opportunities of a new policy. Especially so if it will realize the one great truth of political development which the "practical" man of politics is always missing, namely, that the decision to adopt a new policy is very often the only indispensable condition of its practicability. "I will not try it because it is not practical," says the Representative of the Old Order. "It is not practical because you won't try it," replies the Protagonist of the New.

The decision to take the League of Nations seriously should lead to the negotiation among the Allies of a Public Pact which would deal primarily with the following objects:

1. Political security for every nation resting upon a League of Nations, broadly but definitely outlined, with conditions which would permit the enemy peoples to enter.

2. Equality of economic opportunity secured by equal access to raw materials, to the economic development of backward states, to suitable seaports for land-locked states, by internationalization of trans-continental railways and straits.

3. Democratization of the conduct of international relations, by insuring in the Congresses of the Peace Settlement representation of the legislative as well as the executive side of government, and of the minority parties in the legislatures.

The analysis of the causes which led to Russia's defection, which also underlie the growth of "maximalism" throughout Europe, and explain its attitude to the war, indicates sufficiently why this third clause touching parliamentary and minority representation at the peace conference is essential to the solution of the very difficulties now confronting us. It is indispensable, indeed, to secure recognition of this principle in the Inter-Allied Conference which will be necessary for framing such a restatement of war aims as that indicated above. If minority parties have no representation in such a conference, there will be further demands for a Stockholm conference of Socialists, further refusal of passports, further alienation of radical forces, further disintegration within the frontiers of the Allied nations. If it is provided for, the radical and Socialist forces will either be won to the major aims of the war, or their opposition will be proved to be based on other than democratic grounds.

A government does not represent, in terms of opinion, the nation it rules. It only represents the majority party or parties, who in a year or two may

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be the minorities; while the minorities of today may be the majorities of tomorrow. The settlement which closed the Boer war was made by a British government which two years later was swept out of existence by the land-slide of a liberal opposition which at the time of the war was a hopeless minority. European settlements could not be so easily revised as the government of Henry Campbell-Bannerman revised that of the Balfour-Chamberlain-Milner government of 1902. The British democracy at the end of this war might not necessarily be truly represented by a government composed of Lords Milner and Curzon, Messrs. Balfour and Bonar Law, Sir Edward Carson and Lord Robert Cecil, or by a delegation to the peace conference so composed. A conference may represent the governments of twenty, thirty or forty states, and still represent only one section of western society, that section which the circumstances of war have brought into governmental power.

The problems presented at any international conference may be dealt with by one of two broadly opposed methods, the old familiar nationalist method, or the new and relatively untried internationalist method. The only hope of securing even a fair trial of the latter would be by the Allied participation of those who believe in it with most conviction. But they are today a minority, as were the advocates of the principle of nationality at the time of, say, the Congress of Vienna, and would not be present at a congress representing only the executive branches of governments.

Such a conference, by its very composition, would exclude the only people that have a real and vivid faith in the American policy of democratic internationalism expressed in a League of Nations. That very radical experiment will be entrusted to the hands of elderly diplomats who all their lives have thought in the terms of the old political order, of conflicting national power. They may not oppose the new policy, they may even, like the German Chancellor, quite approve the idea. But in their hearts they believe it Utopian, a truth which jumped to our eyes when we tried to imagine making an offer to Italy in its terms. To expect so new and unprecedented a policy to receive the kind of support necessary to make it a success in a conference made up of representatives of established governments, men whose habits of mind and prepossessions run so strongly with the methods of the past, is to ask for psychological and moral miracles. Capacity to initiate "unprecedented things," as the President calls them, cannot reside in men drawn from professions, diplomacy and government, dominated by precedent. They may perhaps work them out; the initiation and advocacy must come from men who believe in them with the faith that moves mountains.

It will be objected that, when the conference has reached its decisions, the legislatures of the constituent states and minority parties therein will have an opportunity of criticism. It would be futile criticism. To give effect to it, the forty governments would have to reassemble the conference, and even so it would still be composed of the nominees of the executives. The thing would be hopeless. The decisions of the conference, however much in theory subject to the ratification of the constituent states, would be final, notwithstanding that in fact the whole process would violate one of the fundamental principles of democratic government, namely, that the executive branch of a government shall not have legislative power. For as a matter of fact, the decision of the conference will constitute laws of the future, some of the most important laws with which mankind will be concerned. They will have been made by representatives of executives responsible only to executives. The historical and constitutional position of the diplomat is that of the sovereign's ambassador.

Imagine the law-making power of the United States in the hands of a body composed of delegates appointed by the governors of each state, and responsible to them alone, and that there existed neither Congress nor President. What would have been the chance of creating a unified and democratic America by such means?

Yet we are now faced by a problem of integration, of the Alliance immediately, if we are to win the war, and of western society finally, if we are to make our victory of any avail. Whether the thing be possible or not, we must assume that it is, at least as a working hypothesis, since we are fighting for it, and refrain from using instruments which, not only do not promise success, but actually stand in the way of it, if they do not make it impossible. If the conduct of international affairs is to be considered as the management of the affairs of a community we desire to integrate, we must not use instruments suited only to assert the interest of one separate unit as against another.

So long as the virtual conduct of international affairs, the various steps in negotiations, is in the hands of executive branches of the national government and preponderantly in the hands of the foreign offices, decisive power in such affairs will always be autocratic, whatever the form of those governments at home. We are waging a war for the purpose of democratizing Germany, and we may succeed in imposing parliamentary control on the chancellor, deposing the Kaiser, even introducing a constitution as democratic as that of England, or Italy or France. But in the one region of German politics which directly touches us, and

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the only one which does so directly, power will be, in fact if not in theory, as irresponsible as ever if the old diplomatic system is retained. For, if the various stages of international negotiation are left to diplomats reporting secretly to their governments, those diplomats will always have it in their power to create a situation which may compel their countries to go to war, present a nation, that is, with the alternative of war or failure to fulfil an obligation given secretly or semi-secretly; or war as against dangerous political isolation. Popular control of a government's foreign policy is a fiction where the government is free to create step by step a certain diplomatic situation. And those steps can only be controlled by an organic change in the management of international affairs, by making the formation of international policy the work of a democratic international body of a parliament of the peoples. The immediate problem before us in that connection is this: With whom shall we talk at the coming peace—the German people or the German autocracy? If we insist upon some form of proportional representation of legislatures at the conference, and upon that branch of the conference exercising powers of revision and even veto, we shall have taken power in foreign affairs out of the hands of the German autocracy and put it in the hands of the German people as represented in the Reichstag. By this one fact we shall have succeeded in giving parliamentary institutions to Germany.

Were it now made known that we stood for this principle, the Allies would enter into practical alliance with the forces in Germany now fighting for parliamentary institutions. For they would realize that this item of the Allied peace terms would give them parliamentary control of the most important act of their state. Such is probably the only way in which the principle of "No peace with the present German rulers" could be carried into effect. And the same principle which would take control out of the hands of a military autocracy in Germany would take it out of the hands of a Bolshevik autocracy in Russia, by insisting upon the representation there also of all parliamentary parties.

But more urgent than the settlement is the waging of the war itself, and the dangers which threaten our alliance in that task. Until the essentials just indicated have become the obvious and determined policy of the Allies, all those forces here touched upon as working within the Alliance will revive, disuniting us and uniting the enemy; and he will have the advantage in every "peace drive" that he cares to make, since we shall be unable effectively to reply. He will have the advantage on the political side, and so long as our alliance is unsound in its foundation, by being based upon disruptive rather than unifying aims, he will have the advantage on the military side as well. To take the President seriously, to convert his "idealism" into policy, the common policy of the Allies, is the price of victory as it is the promise of permanent peace.

The Evolution of Germany

THE complicated party groupings of European politics are always something of a puzzle to the English-speaking onlooker. Our traditional habit of reducing our shades of opinion to the artificial simplicity of a two-party system involves irksome compromises, but undoubtedly it makes in times of crisis for effective and united action. One can often determine in continental affairs when the real moment for action has come, by noting whether the emergency has yet caused the momentary adoption of something like the two-party grouping. When that happens, the two hosts are really ranged for a decisive battle. The crisis has passed from debate to action: the dramatic moment has come. There were in France in our day three simplifications of this type, firstly when every Frenchman was forced to declare himself Dreyfusard or anti-Dreyfusard, again when the church was separated from the state, and lastly, on the eve of the war, during the drawn battle over the term of military service. In Russia, such is the need of decision, that even with proportional representation, only two of a dozen parties have emerged in numbers worth counting, the Bolsheviki and the Social Revolutionaries.

The peculiarity of German politics and the explanation of their flatness and irresolution is that this dramatic simplification of parties is in them the rarest of all phenomena. It happened during Bismarck's battle with the church, but never in our own day. The nearest approach to it was in 1907, when the Socialists and the Center united to refuse the credits for the native war in Southwest Africa, compelled Prince Bülow to dissolve the Reichstag, and fought a general election against Imperialism, or, as they called it, "Hurrah-Patriotism." This is a bad instance to quote, partly because the Center was half-hearted, and even more because the Socialist party in those days could never form a stable coalition with other parties, or compose a govern-

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ing majority, since it adhered to its revolutionary strategy and refused to vote for any budget as a whole. That momentary coalition against Imperialism, though it had a majority of the votes actually cast, came back as a minority to the Reichstag.

Watching the course of German internal politics during this war, as closely as one can through the medium of German papers, one begins at last to notice unmistakable signs of crystallization which betray a dramatic crisis. The old party groups are by no means obliterated, and their concentration will only be temporary. While it lasts, there is a real struggle, simple and dramatic, as decisive movements in democratic politics must always be. A two-party system has emerged. There is on the one hand the "Fatherland party," socially formidable, numerically weak, with Admiral von Tirpitz at its head. It scarcely exists in the Reichstag, but it is recruiting its membership outside it in the bureaucracy, in the army and in the middle classes by methods which include the severest pressure by officials upon their subordinates and by social leaders on those who come under their influence. Over against it stands the Reichstag majority—the Radicals, the Catholic Center and the official Socialists. It lacks any one leader so authoritative as Tirpitz, and seems to be personified for the popular mind chiefly by Scheidemann and Erzberger.

This two-party system in itself marks a new phase in Germany's evolution. In a vigorous article upon it (Das Zweiparteiensystem, Die Hilfe, November 1st) Friedrich Naumann welcomes it as an open recognition that Germany has become a parliamentary state. The Tirpitz opposition faces the Reichstag majority, which supports the Hertling ministry. Hitherto the conflict had been suppressed. It went on within the government itself while Tirpitz was still a minister. In the crisis which led up to the war, and through all the early period of the war, there was in Germany not one government but two, and Tirpitz waged a continual warfare at headquarters against Bethmann-Hollweg, with the Kaiser as the arbiter between them.

Today the battle lies between Tirpitz and the Reichstag's majority. It is a battle which covers the whole field of domestic and foreign policy, from the reform of the Prussian franchise to the settlement of the Belgian question. To some extent it is a class issue. The "Fatherland party" is an attempt to fuse the agrarian conservatism of the Prussian Junker with the industrial capitalism of the National Liberal, adding a military and bureaucratic infusion to the blend, until from these elements a nationalist phalanx emerges. A little less extravagant than the old "pan-Germans," a little less parochial than Prussian conservatism, it is to perfection what the world means when it talks of "Prussian Militarism." It cares a great deal about Belgium, the eastern frontier, and the Prussian franchise, but it sees beyond these questions a simpler and more fundamental issue. It stands for resistance to the parliamentary idea. Its concern from the moment of its creation has been to suggest that the chiefs of the army are behind it, and that the army itself stands in opposition to the Reichstag. It seems to be working in effect for a military dictatorship, which would supersede both the civil government and the Reichstag. It may not contemplate anything so crude as a military coup d'état, but it means to use the moral prestige of Hindenburg to destroy the democratic movement; it tries to call in the army to frustrate the Reichstag's idea of a "peace of reconciliation." The two issues are in reality one. "A policy of violence abroad," as Naumann puts it,* "leads to violence at home, and a predatory policy abroad means robbery at home. . . . If we would be free at home, we must respect the freedom of other peoples." From the first days of this war some of us have maintained the heresy that no hands can destroy Prussian militarism, save those of the German people itself. In the fluctuations of the ranged battle between the Fatherland party and the Reichstag majority, we shall have the measure of its sincerity, its insight and its success.

The center of the battle turns on the rights and position of the Reichstag itself. Paper constitutions are an inadequate and fallible measure of a people's freedom. Of effective democracy there was in Germany before the war rather less than the written constitution allowed; there is today more than a reading of the constitution would suggest. The most liberal constitution is worthless without the will and capacity to work it, while the firm will of a united representative chamber may give driving power to a very defective constitutional machine. The Reichstag always had at its command the essential instrument of parliamentary control, for it could refuse supplies. It made some use of that power, but never with the conscious

*Another passage from Naumann's articles on the Fatherland Party (Die Hilfe, November 22) is worth quoting: "The policy of conquest and violence of the Conservatives, pan-Germans and Fatherland party must infallibly lead, as happened in the system of Napoleon I, to the repression of the political aspiration of the nation for freedom and the setting up of a despotic militarism. Not all of them consciously desire a strong hand and a military dictatorship, which will send the Reichstag about its business, but the logic of events is driving them to it. In any case we daily hear their cry, 'In God's name, no liberal reforms during the War.'"

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tactical purpose of asserting its own rights as a sovereign body. Thus it rejected votes for the navy again and again, up till 1900, in the Boer war. It forced a general election by refusing the military colonial vote in 1907. It often rejected an unpopular tax. It never, however, deliberately set itself the task of forcing a chancellor to conform to its policy by steadily using the power of the purse. The real reason was that it rarely had a policy, and never had or could have a governing progressive majority. The fighting van of the progressive democracy lay in the Socialist party, which could criticize or suggest, stimulate or attack, but could not control, because it would never form a coalition with middle-class parties, and always on principle voted against the budget on the final reading. That reason is sufficient to explain the impotence of the progressive groups in the Reichstag.

The decisive internal event of the war in Germany has been the conversion of the "majority" Socialists to "reformist" tactics. They now stand shoulder to shoulder with the Radicals and the Center; a moderately progressive coalition exists, with the will and the numbers to control the government. It used the power of the purse for the first time effectively during the crisis of last July. It withheld its assent to the war credits and Bethmann-Hollweg fell by reason of its mistrust. The first solution of the crisis was unsatisfactory, but happily temporary. The Kaiser made an extreme use of his power to nominate the new chancellor, and chose as the leader of the German people an obscure official, exactly as he might have sent a governor from a desk in Berlin to an African colony. The Reichstag was not consulted, but Dr. Michaelis began his term of office by accepting the Reichstag's peace formula. There followed grotesque attempts to equivocate, but in the end the Reichstag won. It secured the pledge that its leaders should be consulted over every decisive move in foreign affairs, and they were able to secure the definite insertion of the famous peace resolution in the reply to the Pope.

Dr. Michaelis was, however, impossible, and soon alienated the Reichstag first by his tolerance of the propaganda of the Fatherland party in the army, and then by his mishandling for party purposes of the grossly exaggerated naval mutiny. When he fell, the extent of the Reichstag's growing power became measurable. Count Hertling accepted office, only after he had assured himself of a majority by bargaining with its leaders for the support of the Coalition majority. He gave definite pledges for sundry reforms, and assigned to parliamentarians the two chief places in the ministry. The choice of Hertling was remarkable not merely because he is neither a Prussian, a Junker, nor an official, but above all because he had to recognize that he could govern only with the support of the people's representatives.

It is not easy to determine the exact meaning of this event. It looks like the turning point in German constitutional development. It is a decisive precedent, and it will be the fault of the Reichstag itself if a chancellor is ever again appointed save with its assent. For the moment the German people has rulers of its own choice, in so far, at least, as a Reichstag elected long years ago in peace can speak for it today. A formal constitutional change on paper is difficult, because the German empire is a federation which rests on a treaty basis. It is not Prussia or the Crown which alone resist a formal change. So do the south German states, which value their rights in the Federal Council (Bundesrat), and wish to preserve it as a check upon the Reichstag, in which, on the basis of population, Prussian votes are necessarily a majority. The newspapers of the majority write in a tone of confidence and optimism. The Socialist minority, from its unbending idealistic standpoint, is indisposed to admit that anything fundamental has been won. These utterances are obviously tactical. The majority wishes to make the utmost of its own partial success. The unofficial Socialists, pressing for much more, affect to think that little has been got. The foreign observer, watching these momentous happenings through belated and censored newspapers, procured with difficulty, has, however, a third witness whom he may call in. What is the view of the German reaction? There is no indecision in its voice. It declares in all its newspapers that the ark of the covenant has been betrayed, that the rights of the All-Highest have been infringed, that Germany has succumbed to the disease of western parliamentarism. I will quote, however, not the shrill voice of the Deutsche Tageszeitung, but the deliberate utterances of the two Junker leaders in the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet. In the debate on Count Hertling's first appearance, Scheidemann had said, November 22nd:

> Unless a miracle happens, then Michaelis is the last Chancellor to appear in this House as a "nominee," without having made sure in advance of having a majority behind him. That is the democratic result of the last change of chancellorship.

Compare these words with the verdict of Count Westarp, the Conservative leader, in the same debate. He began by "animadverting severely" on the manner of Count Hertling's appointment. The "democratic camps," he said, "desire the fall of Dr. Michaelis because he was nominated without previous consent of the Reichstag." This was, he declared, "a serious attack upon the constitutional right of the Emperor to nominate as chancellor a man after the measure of his own judgment."

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The same tendency, he argued, was even clearer in the nomination of Dr. von Payer, the Radical leader, as vice-chancellor. He had gone into the ministry avowedly "in order to support there the party government of the Social Democrats and the Progressive People's party." This too, like "the fixed conditions arranged with the majority parties" when Count Hertling was appointed, is "an attack on the constitutional rights of the Emperor." From a verbose speech this passage stands out:

> Under these circumstances we may see in the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor, not so much ministers, whose tasks have been allotted to them by the Emperor alone, as men whose political activity has been made dependent upon a previous agreement with supporters of the so-called majority of the Reichstag. They are in a position in which they must rely one-sidedly and exclusively on these majority parties.

These Junker speakers are no orators, but could any eloquence be clearer than the dull words of discontent with which the Conservative leader, von Heydebrand, assailed Count Hertling on his first appearance before the Prussian Diet, December 5th:

> The manner of Count Hertling's appointment they regarded as extremely regrettable. He had only taken up office when he had received the *placet* of the Reichstag majority. They could not regard that as permissible. . . . He had submitted to dictation and accepted the program of a majority. . . . They had started on a course of events that would be hard to check, when Dr. Michaelis had to resign because he had taken up office without asking the Reichstag majority.

The present transition phase in Germany's constitutional development is not democracy as America or France or Britain practise it. The Germans, before it is completed, may work out a technique of their own, which will be none the worse if it is based on an historical foundation. In the meantime we may safely say, with the Junkers, that Germany has got a government which came into being only with the assent of the Reichstag, and can continue only by submitting to its "dictation." That is the foundation of democracy.

A candid man will admit that the essential change for which we were hoping in Germany has begun in earnest. For the further impetus, which will make Germany effectively the national democracy, "Volkstaat," which the Frankfurter Zeitung in large headlines already calls it, we must probably wait until a general election has regenerated the Reichstag. In the meanwhile, if we would judge the sincerity of the change, and the solidity of the gain, our clue lies in the main items of contention between the Reichstag majority and the Tirpitz party. The Fatherland party is Prussian militarism at bay. There are three tests. In its demands for a permanent German military control over Belgium (it has given up downright annexation) it is without doubt defeated. The next issue is the Prussian franchise. I have before me the text of the Reform bill, with its most un-Prussian preamble, preaching in so many words "trust in the people" (Vertrauen in das Volk). It makes an end once for all of the Three-class Franchise, and sets up equal and direct voting. When one recollects that in the old system the two wealthier classes had twice the voting power of the third class, which included eighty-five per cent of the population, the minor defects of the new bill are not worth mentioning. The bill sets up for the state Diet of benighted Prussia substantially the same measure of manhood suffrage which the Imperial Reichstag has had from the start. The Kreuz Zeitung (the organ of the Lutheran reaction) predicts that if this bill is passed, the Socialists in a House of 455 members will gain 140 or 150 seats (they now have 10), and the Conservative majority will give place to a majority of Socialists, Poles and Radicals.

But will the bill pass? The German press is full of speculations and accurate countings of votes, from which one gathers that, after stormy debates and many intrigues in the committee stage, it will be either passed or rejected by a narrow margin of ten or twenty votes. The Conservatives mean to fight hard—even against the Kaiser, whose personal support is pledged to the bill. The Prussian Junker fears God, honors the King and expects implicit obedience from both. The ministry is pledged to resist any amendments which would set up plural or unequal voting. Will it stand firm? When this bill passes, the day of the Junker is over, and even in the far from satisfactory bill for the reform of the Prussian Upper House there is no comfort for this doomed class, for it reduces the number of hereditary peers, and introduces "captains of industry" in their place.

The third and most vital test will come promptly before the negotiations with Russia are concluded. To some form of vote Count Hertling is pledged by which Courland, Lithuania and Poland will "determine their own destinies." But will it be a popular vote free from military control? The Reichstag is uneasy, suspects military interference and hints that the vital decision which the referendum is to ratify may be entrusted to local chambers of magnates and landowners. If that evasion is resisted, if these provinces are honestly granted "the right of self-determination," we shall know how to assess the power of the Reichstag's majority and the sincerity of its liberalism. It has won in Belgium. It is winning in Prussia. It has a government, which it can control. Will it realize on the eastern frontier that a nation which itself would be free must respect the freedom of others?

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The Tobacco Conserver

EVER since I have been on the house committee Jones has been looking for trouble. Old-timers tell me he started looking for it almost as soon as he got into the club.

At first it was petitions. Every year or eighteen months he would hand round a document that read like this: "The undersigned, knowing that they and believing that other members would take comfort in a room where (a) pipe-smoking is allowed and (b) silence is enforced, respectfully request that you take steps to supply the club with such a room." Quite a few men signed the earlier petitions, but little by little the number of signatures dropped off. I guess this was because the house committee, if I do say it, always made exactly the right answer. We always said the same thing, namely, that only a small minority of the club wanted such a room, and that the majority were opposed to any further encouragement of pipes in the club house.

After the petition business fizzled out Jones changed his tactics. Every few weeks he went to the library and wrote one of his letters to the house committee. So far as I can make out he never used the club for any other purpose. He kept repeating, until we were sick of hearing it, that there was no place in the club where a man could both read undisturbed by talk among his neighbors and also smoke a pipe. We used to reply to his letters. Our reasons for standing pat were unanswerable. We called Jones's attention to the fact that the profits on the sales of cigars and cigarettes were pretty important to the club, and that these profits would shrink if members took to smoking pipes all over the place. Jones wouldn't believe it. Besides, he wrote us, suppose the profits on cigar and cigarette sales are cut: would not the size of the cut be a rough measure of the members' desire to smoke pipes? We never gave him our best reason, namely, that pipes are out of place in a good club. They look pretty cheap except, of course, in the country, where there is plenty of open air.

Well, this kind of thing ran along until Jones quit writing us letters. We thought we were through with him, and thanked God accordingly. But about a couple of weeks ago he tried a new dodge. He started in to make capital out of the members' patriotism. He got up a circular, printed it and mailed a copy to every man in the club. To read what he says you would think the best patriot was a pipe smoker. Cigarettes, he asserts, meaning those of ordinary size, run a trifle under three pounds of tobacco to the thousand. At $2.50 a hundred this makes the price per pound to the consumer about $8.40.

Jones's next objective is the cigar smokers. He goes deep into the subject, but I'll quote only his extreme figures. He takes the cheapest imported Havana cigar that the club sells, not the cheapest per cigar, you understand, but the cheapest per pound, which happens to be a Londres turned out by one of the independent manufacturers, and weighs almost 14½ pounds per thousand. We sell this for $16 a hundred, so Jones figures out the pound price of tobacco smoked in this form to be a trifle over $11. In the form of our best cigar, which is made from a particularly good crop that is getting scarce, tobacco costs the smoker just over $23 a pound. It is a large cigar, weighing 24 pounds per thousand and selling at $56 per hundred

Now, says Jones in his circular, this is war. Which will you do—go on smoking tobacco in cigarettes at $8.40 a pound, in cigars at from $11 to $23 a pound, or in a pipe at from $3 down to 90 cents a pound? You can easily change your habits if you want to. In less than a month nearly anybody can learn to prefer a pipe. (I don't believe this, but it is what Jones says). True, the government will lose revenue if you cut off your cigars and cigarettes. But suppose you help the government by lending it what you save?

Jones admits that he is addressing the rich first of all, and has chosen his cigar figures with the rich in mind. Let the rich begin, he says, and the moderately well-to-do and the poor will fall in line. Let the club begin and pipes will sooner or later be tolerated in restaurants. Smoke your pipe after dinner at home and tell your guests to bring theirs. Smoke a pipe and help win the war by saving.

I am sorry to say these circulars are having a certain effect. Some of the quietest members, men who have never given us any trouble, have written to the house committee asking that pipes be allowed in the library. Several radicals have asked why they shouldn't be free to smoke a pipe anywhere. The committee is in a rather awkward position. A few weeks ago some dozen British officers were guests of the club. They were so surprised to discover our rules against pipe-smoking that as a measure of international courtesy we had to permit pipes in the big west room downstairs. Now that our guests have gone I am trying to get the committee to withdraw this permission, but some of our weaker men are afraid this wouldn't look well. They won't see that our first duty is to rescind the thin end of the wedge.

What our decision will be is more than I know. But I do know one thing, namely, that the day when pipes are admitted to the library I shall stop darkening its doors. Fortunately the city still contains clubs where a gentleman's nostrils are in no danger.

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Strategy in Food

The Food Administration—I

"THE Food Administration deals in strategies," one of its members said. And an appreciation of what he implied makes it easier to understand just what Mr. Hoover's organization is contributing to our part of the offensive, and what it is likely to contribute in the future.

The Food Administration has been working to feed three hundred million people out of a supply that ordinarily does for two hundred and fifty million. With such a problem the administration must be interested, first of all, in stimulating production. It must attempt to organize agriculture, and extend to the producer the encouragement of an agreeable profit. But the problem of the administration also gives it an interest in distribution. And profits for the producer, accordingly, must not put prices out of reach for the consumer. Distribution demands a system of licenses and checks, to effect some sort of organization in the broad belt of "middlemen." When it comes to the consumer's turn, the administration is responsible for a greatly increased conservation. And there is a danger in appearing to resort to coercion.

Where, in this program, does the need for strategy first appear? It appears right at the start—in the work of stimulating production. Congress, which has a practised skill in putting concrete walls between the halves of things, decided last summer that though the Food Administration should have the job of feeding a half dozen nations, all the special war powers and tools for a stimulation of production should be placed, not in the Food Administration's hands, but in the hands of the Department of Agriculture. That is one reason why the Food Administration deals in strategies.

But it is a minor reason, and one artificially introduced. The administration has problems in strategy which have not been prepared for it by Congress but by the general interlocking of all economic interests. There are ways of stimulating production which the Department of Agriculture lacks. The Food Administration can enter the market as a buyer, and, if its purchases are large and rightly timed, encourage production by setting a prevailing minimum price. But here there is sharp need of strategy. If the administration too perfectly stimulates the production of potatoes, it may coincidentally discourage the production of beans. It must weigh the relativity of all domestic interests, in working for increased production. And, also, it must often weigh the relativity of domestic interests as against foreign interests. Three months ago there were two million cattle starving in Texas. And there were, on the wharves of a Texas gulf port, thirty thousand tons of cotton-seed cake, performing no useful mission. So the Food Administration, without waiting for a series of inter-departmental conferences which might not have culminated before the pile of cotton-seed cake had moved elsewhere, dispatched a representative to Texas to buy the cake and feed it to the cattle. But here an international strategy was demanded. The cake, it was discovered, belonged to Denmark. What the Danish government thought about taking compensation for its cotton-seed cake accordingly became one of the factors in stimulating the production of beef in Texas.

Production, in the sense of furnishing a supply to the consumer, of course includes distribution and conservation as well as original stimulation of output. And here, too, the Food Administration must deal in strategy, partly because it lacks important powers—for which it must substitute persuasion, as when it treats with retailers—and partly because none of its problems can be isolated from a mass of dependent considerations. Distribution must be considered in the light of the competitive demands that coal and iron make on the railways; of the possibilities of taking one district or another off the market by stimulating a local production of foodstuffs; of interferences and adjustments so intimate that they seem to outrage a sense of privateness as they lead, like cards that have been toppled over, far from their first source. And conservation, no less than distribution, makes a demand for strategy. A community cannot be urged to live on substitutes unless the substitutes can be more economically furnished. A family cannot be encouraged to save food unless it already has enough of an income to live well. An apparently non-essential industry cannot be closed down, if its closing starts a new ring of disturbances. The Food Administration found, when it was inquiring into the consumption of sugar, that candy factories and sales-rooms employed a quarter of a million women workers. Where was the federal agency to make immediate provision for these women, if they were dumped into the labor market?

It is of course true that no government agency is free to consider its problems absolutely, and without any resort to strategy. The Navy Department cannot proceed to the construction of a ship

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without taking into account the demand which other agencies will make upon the available supplies of steel, power and labor. But for all government agencies other than the Food Administration there are limits to this relativity of interest. The Navy and the Ordnance Department and the Quartermaster Corps need only consider the countless routine events of ordinary life as they themselves are affected by them. The Food Administration must consider these countless events as they affect each other. No matter how closely it narrows its responsibilities, how exclusively it takes up such problems as speculation and price control only as they affect production, and not as good and evil in themselves, it nevertheless retains an interest in every public and private exchange of commodities, and in every movement of labor. Lacking adequate powers, and fixed at the center of all trade intercourse, it is only through a superbly statesmanlike strategy that it can hope to feed an Allied world on reduced rations.

Working out from the center of this problem, we may begin with the type of organization which the Food Administration has chosen to use as its instrument. The importance of strategy seems to have been taken into account in the planning of that organization. It has none of the traits of the conventional Washington office. It has not even a chart, hanging in its public ante-chamber, to show the little squares by which its business would regularly move if, when a pinch came, it frequently didn't jump squares like the knight on a chess-board.

It is that absence of a chart, or rather impossibility of being charted, that explains the methods of the Food Administration. Not one of the executives in the administration has a definite and perpetual job. Theoretically and practically each is an "Assistant to the Food Administrator," and nothing more. He is never an almost independent sovereign, ruling an almost disattached province. For the Food Administration has no disattached provinces. It has subordinate bureaus. As many as any organization in Washington. It has the incorporated Grain Administration and a bureau to look after Sugar and the important bureau of Conservation and more than two dozen others. But it doesn't choose even to call them bureaus. They are "divisions"—and purely opportunist divisions, the Food Administration carefully insists. Not one of them is far from its neighbors. If the chief of Sugar can be of more use as assistant chief of Potatoes, he is put there, without ado, and without waiting for an order of transferal to go up a ladder of approvals and down the other side, with chances good that by the time he reaches potatoes he will be much more serviceable back at Sugar. There is in the Food Administration one executive, Mr. Sullivan, whose record is by no means exceptional, and who has in the past several months held responsible positions, successively, in the divisions of Wheat, Dairy Products, Bread, and Labor-Consumers' Interests—with Meats just coming to him as a new activity. This is a wide orbit, and Mr. Sullivan did not traverse it because he failed to "fit in," anywhere along the way, but because changes in outside problems made him more genuinely useful in one job than in another. How many phases of the war would we have passed through before Mr. Sullivan could describe a similar orbit through any other government department in Washington?

This sort of organization permits flexibility in the use of men. It permits the same flexibility in the handling of "situations." As things ordinarily go in the Food Administration a "situation" is discovered by the temporary chief of a temporary division known as "Miscellaneous Commodities Section." This official sees a situation in, let us say, cotton-seed. Heretofore cotton-seed will have been receiving no individual specialized attention from an individual agency. It is now taken into the Miscellaneous Commodities Section, where it has several other growing situations as companions. It has not yet a portfolio of its own. It has only one pocket of a portfolio. And it gets no more, unless it appears—as it now appears in the case of oils and fats—that the situation is unique enough and genuine enough to demand a "division" of its own. Then, without any congressmen introducing bills about it, such a division is instantly established. And if, later on, it seems that there is no longer a unique situation in oils and fats, then the division of oils and fats is dissolved, oils and fats are temporarily returned to the Miscellaneous Commodities Section, and the executives who have been at work on oils and fats are at once freed for other service. That is not bureaucracy. It is adaptability. There is not a branch of the Food Administration in which sap is not running. When the sap stops, the branch is pruned.

The distinct superiority of organization of this sort is the way it fosters strategy inside of the office to fill the need for strategy outside of it. The ordinary bureaucracy in Washington has a cast-iron organization. Between cast-iron walls all incoming problems must flow. And when the problems grow hot, the organization, like all other cast-iron things, cracks. Unlike the Quartermaster Corps, for instance, the Food Administration can expand its walls with the heat and contract them with the chill. It can meet situations in the way they arise, at the time they arise. It comes very

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near being a completely adjustable organization.

Certain desirable results follow. For one thing, the Food Administration, internally, has no need of that practice which is at the base of most of Washington's troubles: "coördination." No one needs to lay painstakingly intricate plans to "coördinate" a body which has never genuinely been disunited. In the second place, genuine unity of organization brings responsibility. Coördinators like the General Staff of the army can only learn that an order is carried out by not learning that it has not been carried out. In the absence of a complaint they assume the best. They are too separate from actual administration to have any better assurance. Finally, this unified and pliable type of organization encourages versatility. It permits different sorts of problems to be met with different sorts of machinery. How different, succeeding articles will show.

CHARLES MERZ.

Sargent's Wilson

NOW AT THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM

HE is leaning forward a little, with an arm on each arm of his chair. Neither hand is quite resigned to the situation, quite given up to the moment. In the left one, especially, we discover an impatience which we find again, somewhat more faded or more under control, in his face. These visitors whom we do not see, whom the painter has put us in the place of, did not this professor understand several minutes' ago everything they could have to say to him? Of course he did. His mind is fleeter of foot than their minds. Now he is ready to have them go, he is more than ready to turn his chair again to the table, where his documents are and his heart is. Matter printed or typewritten is so much more orderly and informing, so much less an interruption, than words hot in the mouths of flesh and blood intruders.

What is he professor of? No narrow specialty, surely. Those eyes, hard and cold although they can stare, on occasion, are evidently accustomed to liberal prospects. A habit of speaking to a listening world, from that part of his intellect which most resembles his heart, has saved his didactic lips from any such look of petulance as blind nature half intended them to wear. Perhaps his specialty is the future. Yes, that must be it. Mr. Sargent has shown us a Professor of the Future, whom a delegation from the present, the coarse present in which things are every day either done or left undone, has interrupted. When the present has picked up its hat and bowed itself out he will be relieved to be left alone again with the future.

CORRESPONDENCE

The New Republic and the War

SIR: Among the men I saw during the year I have just spent abroad I found The New Republic quoted more often and more seriously than any other American publication. Naturally the angles of interest differed, but the readers were alike in keenness of interest. The explanation lies, I think, in the fact that The New Republic is alert, unattached and bold. One of the deep-reaching evils of our time is the standardization of periodicals. Shortly before he died, William James said the intellectual leadership of the United States had been taken away from the universities by the ten-cent magazines. What would he say about periodical intellect if he were alive today?

That you are subject to criticism is inevitable. All free thought is criticized in a time of stress, and I am not without sympathy for those who wish every emphasis put on action uncomplicated by reflection; not without sympathy, yet convinced that such persons are dangerous. They exist, of course, in every country. In Germany the Berliner Tageblatt, Vorwärts, Scheidemann, Erzberger, are looked upon by the Right as seditious. In France reactionaries like Daudet, and even violent Progressives like Clemenceau and Hervé, class together Socialists and traitors. In England the Morning Post and the Daily Mail condemn most bitterly the Manchester Guardian and the London Daily News. Men with more pugnacity than foresight are grieved and horrified by Mr. Asquith and Lord Lansdowne. It may be that anti-thought bitter-enders contribute their quota to the task in hand, but if there were no liberals and open thinkers these bitter-enders would land the world in Prussianism.

It was the predominance of the Northcliffe and Clemenceau schools that made the Anglo-French diplomacy toward Russia so disastrous. It prevented Stockholm, overthrew Kerensky and alienated the Bolsheviki. It has been under the influence of the same type of thinkers that the Entente war aims have been stated in so geographical a manner that even the President has become involved in complex boundary claims. The Entente position is that the liberal elements in Germany are invited to make no claims at all in territory, while the Entente breaks up Prussia under the banner of Poland, retakes Alsace-Lorraine by force of arms, instead of leaving it to an impartial tribunal, dictates the relations of Austria to Bohemia and Jugoslavia, rearranges Turkey, and refrains from any downright promise to return the German colonies. The Soukhomlinov revelations have not checked our love of treating Germany's reason for going to war as flat villainy with no human complications. We have no space to give to reminding ourselves of intrigues against Austria carried on in Serbia by the Czar's government. A deeper and more universal diplomacy, looking at the future and also at the past with more imagination, would show a willingness to leave to arbitrament all the questions involved, except that of Belgium, on simple conditions, as for example:

1. That the proper constitution of an international council be arranged ahead, with neutrals strongly represented.
2. That the Reichstag be the spokesman for Germany.

Belgium was a neutral and her restoration and compensation is not open to argument. What has happened to belligerents is a wholly different matter. The President was wise to use the word "must" for Belgium, "should" for the others. It is hopeless to say that Germany must give up all her conquests, while England keeps

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most of hers, or dictates the results of them, while France reclaims Alsace-Lorraine complete and without negotiations, while Italy still makes emphatic demands, and while Austria's internal arrangements are settled for her by her enemies.

Unintelligence in war aims goes hand in hand with an ostrich policy about the facts. Journalists who tell the truth about conditions in any field of action are looked upon as weakening morale instead of strengthening it. This is one of the most damaging conventions now at work. Clearness of sight would help us to our end far more than feeble and ignorant optimism.

How much the world is paying for the satisfaction each opposing group of governments derive from being wholly in the right! How much it has still to pay! How little leadership there has been in the press or in the governments, and how those who do show light are treated to grave reproof!

To think impartially and yet to pull a strong oar is a difficult feat that, it seems to me, has been performed by The New Republic. In Europe it has been accomplished most conspicuously by the Manchester Guardian, in my opinion the best daily in Europe. It has also been accomplished by the London Daily News, the Westminster Gazette and some few others. I do not include the Nation, because while it thinks ably and is to me extremely interesting, it is rather difficult to maintain that it pulls a strong oar for victory. To carry on a political and diplomatic offensive in such a way as to hearten the military offensive, is the task; a difficult one, but always the highest paths are rugged.

If I write in simple declaratives, without a mass of whereases, buts and ifs, it is because the largest lesson of my year abroad seems to me so clear. It is the lesson that flexible minds are needed everywhere. That The New Republic is able to think impartially, and has the courage to reflect a world point of view in the midst of national chauvinism, gives it a value apart, and makes it deserve the enthusiastic support that so many of those who think freely are eager to give to it.

NORMAN HAPGOOD.

Washington, D. C.

To Kreisler's Defense

SIR: American news comment reaches us tardily here. We have only just learned of the agitation, in various cities in the United States, against Mr. Fritz Kreisler, the Austrian violinist. I, personally, know nothing of the grounds upon which these attacks are based. The newspaper accounts which I have seen state merely that he is an alien enemy and that he was, for a short time at the beginning of the war, a combatant in the Austrian army.

If this is the whole case against Mr. Kreisler, then there must be many thousands of Americans who have already protested against such petty persecution of a great artist.

At our mess, here on the western front, we have among our phonograph records, Tschaikowsky's Chanson Sans Paroles, interpreted by Mr. Kreisler. We play it again and again. We are fifteen pilots in the Escadrille Lafayette, and Mr. Kreisler aids and comforts us, not only daily but many times daily. Technically we are his enemies—but only technically. Should he not then be proceeded against by the Austrian authorities as a traitor to his own government? I offer this as the only kind of argument which will be likely to appeal to that type of Junker American which is carrying on hate-campaigns in the United States.

Mr. Kreisler ought to know that the American people as a whole deeply regret the spiteful persecution to which he has been subject; that they have had no part in it and will never countenance those—fortunately relatively few in numbers—who think it necessary to stoop to such measures in order to wage war.

SERGEANT JAMES N. HALL.

France.

What is Commerce?

SIR: In your issue of January 5th, which I received with open arms in a social Sahara, is a clever bit, In Praise of Dullness, that seems to reach a long way, in fact probably around the circle. It brings to my mind what the late William Price once reported of an evening he had had the pleasure of spending with some professors of economics and sociology and what not. The question of commerce came up, and after some flubdubbing in general Mr. Price asked various professors present for a definition of commerce. No one seemed to be able to give it with "the limited time" at hand. It "would take a volume" or a "whole evening's lecture" to do it. Mr. Price at once said that he thought it was the trading of some article or commodity not too badly needed for something more needed or desirable, adding "but that won't make a college course, and you cannot make your living out of it." A large padding of "dullness" seems necessary for the maintenance of both press and educational institutions. Is it a measure of our civilization?

CLARENCE V. RAWSON.

Girard, Pennsylvania.

Ancestor Worship

SIR: Reading Professor Beard's statement in your issue of December 29th recalls to my mind the peroration of an address made before a certain international peace conference by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler. "The duty of one generation," said he, "is to pass on to the next, unimpaired, the institutions it has inherited from its forbears." The statement stoood thus in the published record of the proceedings. Might one not say that if it had been made by a grammar school student one would have felt that he had made poor use of his learning from even the garbled histories offered the youthful mind?

G. O. WILKINSON.

Blythe, California.

Bohemia's Claims

SIR: My plea is in behalf of Bohemia, the country of the Tchechs. She has fought for centuries with all the might of her intelligence to obtain for herself that which is everywhere recognized as the inheritance of every culturally matured nation, namely: the right to self-government, freedom of language, religion and the press, and political independence. It would seem about time that liberally minded men, men capable equally of reasoning and feeling, should take it upon themselves to examine the grounds upon which Bohemia rests her claims. It is high time that she be brought into public and active discussion, for when peace is declared no bare diplomatic bone is likely to appease the demand for justice of a long-suffering nation.

H. W.

Ithaca, New York.

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At the Capitol

NO matter what becomes of the bills now pending in the Senate for the creation of a Director of Munitions and a Supreme War Council, one thing is certain. Had our legislative and executive branches been more responsibly connected both of these questions could have been brought to an issue at least a month ago. When the first testimony before the Committee on Military Affairs revealed poor planning and poor purchasing in the war organization, it would have been helpful if the Senate could have interrogated members who were publicly delegated to speak for the President, in the manner in which the British Parliament frequently interrogates Mr. Lloyd-George. The issue could have been reached without much of the misunderstanding that has arisen. But without this immediate responsibility it was first necessary to run along for weeks with an investigation which was occasionally petty, often irrelevant, and always leisurely. Then a bill, introduced by Senator Chamberlain, waited in committee for two weeks because the President had taken no position publicly on the questions of a War Council and a Director of Munitions. When the President takes a position publicly, as he did on suffrage and conscription and food control, Congress declares that he is usurping its legislative functions. When he doesn't, Congress complains that it has nothing to go ahead on. In the present instances Congress knows at least where the administration stands, but should it have had to wait for this knowledge until Senator Chamberlain went to New York and made a speech, thus drawing from the President his emphatic declaration? There is need for "coördinating" Congress and the administration, as well as Ordnance and the Shipping Board.

There had been planned for this week a debate in the Senate on the subject of war aims. It was to be centered on a resolution of Senator Lewis's, placing the Senate on record as supporting the fourteen definite conditions of peace which the President had laid down. The resolution has been delayed because the Committee on Foreign Relations has not been able to agree on its wording. The debate, when it comes, may produce less artificial discussion than earlier debates on war aims have produced. But one incident of the past week raises a doubt as to the advantage even a genuine discussion will bring. On Friday, Mr. London, the Socialist member, made a speech in the House of Representatives. He did not assail the war. Instead he discussed the present need we have of winning to our support the Russians and the liberals of Central Europe. It was a clear speech, and because it came from a mortal Congressman and not from a President so far ahead as to be almost unreal, it made a remarkable impression in Congress. The House had a larger attendance than it usually has when one of its members speaks on an important question. A number of Senators came over from their wing of the Capitol to listen to the address. The audience was attentive, and by unanimous consent removed all restrictions on the time allotted Mr. London—a thing which rarely happens under the rules of the House. It was one of the most unusual and significant days in Congress since the war began.

Who, outside of Washington, heard anything about it? Certainly not many people. Only a very small number of the more important newspapers even suggested that such a speech as Mr. London's had been made, and no one of them gave any adequate report of it, or of the effect it had in Congress. Several newspaper correspondents, men not used to being impressed by "peace talk," thought this effect so remarkable that they sent column and a half stories to their papers—and had them scrapped. Even the Socialist New York Vorwärts, awed by recent ministrations of the espionage act, refrained from printing this careful critical speech by the only Socialist delegate in Congress. What are the chances of any good coming from a "debate" on war aims, when the public is left in almost complete ignorance of an event so significant as this one? If the newspapers are not going to report discussions that are genuinely challenging, no "debates" on war aims will help to clear away the disagreements between ourselves and Central Europe. We have little use at this time for reports of conventional oratory or of Senator Stone's going all the way back to the treaty of Vienna to appear belligerent enough to offset the first unhappy impression he made on the country.

Sooner or later, problems of industrial reorganization must attract the attention of Congress. When peace comes it will bring an upheaval in industry. Millions of men and women will be discharged from munitions works and war trades, millions of soldiers will be demobilized and thrown into the labor market. Industrial capital will be scarce. There will be a world shortage in raw materials. Only energetic and foresighted action can head off widespread unemployment and the misery it will bring to many families. British labor has declared it "the duty of every government to take immediate action, not only to relieve the unemployed when unemployment has set in, but actually, so far as may be practicable, to prevent the occurrence of unemployment." And looking ahead to a situation which must inevitably arise the British government has established a Reconstruction Committee. Englishmen will come out of the war with gains in the reorganization of industry to compensate them in some measure for the sacrifices of war. What has our own national legislature done to assure for us some similar compensation?

On Wednesday there was brought up in the House of Representatives the first measure that looked ahead to the time of reconstruction. It provided for the establishment of a commission to take up just such responsibilities as British labor has declared it the duty of a modern democratic government to assume. But as soon as debate was begun there developed a bitter opposition to the measure. Why? For two reasons. First, it was extravagant. It carried an appropriation of $50,000. And $50,000 is about one three-thousandth part of one per cent of our first year's war budget, and an unseemly sum, many members thought, to throw away on preparations for after-the-war reconstruction. In the second place, the theory of the thing was wrong. As Mr. Rainey said, "In the most abnormal period that has ever occurred in the history of the world we are asked to make these investigations with a view to determining what our career as a nation in the future may be, when normal times are restored." Why be forehanded about anything? The House agreed with Mr. Rainey. By a vote of 199 to 133 it killed the first measure that has come before it looking ahead to the period of reconstruction. At times one who studies Congress is likely to think that its members are of considerably higher grade than they are ordinarily made out to be. It is when such a vote as this is taken that he realizes how large a part of Congress has no wider vision than that required to peddle little district interests. C. M.

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After the Play

MORE than fifty new plays have been seen in New York this hard winter, and out of that number hardly five deserved to be seen. What is the explanation? A large explanation would be exceedingly satisfactory. It might give us a platform and a policy for the American theatre today.

Mr. Kenneth Macgowan has an explanation, which he offers in the Dial of January 3rd. It is economic. We have had enough, he tells us, of pettifogging literary men, mid-Victorians, treating the American theatre as a series of separate plays, the personal effect of each one of which is meticulously analyzed. We want critics who understand society both behind the curtain and in front, who understand the economics of American industrialism and the American theatre, who understand the "system." That system is basic, and the most vital service a critic of the American theatre can perform today is to criticize the system, to work for its radical reform. Until that is done, the critics must be corrupt or corrupted. They are economically dependent on the present theatre, in the same sense as the "commercial manager." It is no use berating the playwright or the manager or the critic. Reform the system. The criticism to which radicals object merely matches the system it pretends to guide.

By the "system," Mr. Macgowan means "the economic organization of the American theatre, with its long-run system in New York and its touring system on the road." And he develops his criticism of this organization to show how the managers have more and more favored plays that are "broadly and obviously popular," and have encouraged playwrights to make "the broadest and most commonplace of appeals." The existence in the public of a lowest common factor is the great discovery of playwright and manager. To cultivate that common factor during a long run in New York, to tour the country with the same object in view, is the ambition of all managers and playwrights who understand that business is business. And hence the economic fostering of a drama that is written for a vast mediocrity. "The huge profits possible have made competition so keen that the costs of production have risen steadily as managers seek more costly casts and scenery to insure success." The result is an "amusement gamble, calling for tremendously profitable successes to offset wasteful investments and big chances," and inducing the critics to conduct "a guessing contest in popularity," as if they and the public really wanted the theatre to furnish the same kind of meretricious excitement as a race or a fight or a debauch.

Everything depends in this diagnosis on what Mr. Macgowan means by the phrase "economic organization of the theatre." Everything depends, so far as "radical" reform is concerned, on the realities he attaches to that phrase. If he means by "economic organization" something more than a way of promoting the theatre which the present state of American culture has favored, if he means that it expresses the inevitable and incorrigible development of business enterprise so long as the United States is a capitalistic country, then he presents us with the prospect of a succession of Hartley Manners bonbons and George Cohan peanut brittle and Eugene Walter bittersweet, or else a social revolution, in which the whole "economic organization" of the United States, of which the theatre is merely typical will be root-and-branch reformed.

A revolution would help. The American theatre would be an entirely different organization if no profit were to be derived from multiplying inferior road companies or oxygenating long runs. But how, without a new "economic organization" of the United States, without a change in the system which is the parent of the theatrical system, does Mr. Macgowan see a radical reform in the theatre? It is true that mediocrity is now deliberately fostered by the fact that repetition and reproduction are profitable. How can they be made unprofitable? By what organic change? Mr. Macgowan does not say the alternatives are Hartley Manners or social revolution. But I infer it. I infer his explanation is really deep.

Those who do not see the possibility of an organic change, who are puzzled and hazy about the "system" anyway, fall back on the reasons why, much more than Mr. Macgowan, they insist on considering what in the present theatre they like or dislike. To these critics the present theatre is much less a result of economic determinism th a sad conjunction of profit-seeking manager, complaisant playwright and herd-like unhappy public that moves all too readily into its stalls. If the managers depend on anything for their present successes, it is on the uncritical character of their public, on a common factor in that public which is not the child of economic organization so much as of an uninstructed taste. To destroy the manager's organization is one way of stopping the traffic in theatrical lollipops, to promote a different spirit, a more self-understanding and self-assertive spirit in the playgoer is another. Why have so many plays failed this season in New York? Partly because the managers have gambled wildly, largely because the public has come to a period when it thinks twice before spending two dollars on theatrical fluff. In this the "literary man" coincides with the public; and he watches with interest the effect of repeated failures on the manager. Has he learned any lesson, in spite of the inducements to over-produce, over-advertise, speculate and squander? And the playwright, has he thought for a moment that there might be something in being "literary" and self-expressive himself?

"Of Dr. Hurd, Bishop of Worcester, Johnson said to a friend, 'Hurd, sir, is one of a set of men who account for everything systematically; for instance, it has been a fashion to wear scarlet breeches; these men would tell you, that according to causes and effects, no other wear could at that time have been chosen.' He, however, said of him at another time to the same gentleman, 'Hurd, sir, is a man whose acquaintance is a valuable acquisition.'"

How far Mr. Macgowan goes with his "system" remains to be seen. He intends to give the pettifogging critics still more of his mind. When he insists on the evil of long runs and the touring system, who will dispute with him? The dispute arises when he suggests that the economic explanation is sufficient. The best plays to be seen in New York at present have been produced by managers who look for short runs and seek playwrights who address knowing audiences. An occasional broadly popular play like Business Before Pleasure is worth considering, but the genuine triumphs of the theatre are small-theatre or small-manager productions that keep their eye on the dramatic object. A few of these, despite the economic organization of the theatre, make a living. They show what can be done in the theatre, on the fringes of profiteering Broadway. They indicate that a happy conjunction of manager and playwright and public is possible regardless of the system. They even suggest that the system is the product of all three.

F. H.

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Books and Things

SOMEWHERE in Heaven. January 1, 1918 (delayed in transmission). This afternoon your correspondent finally succeeded, by methods which if divulged would be widely imitated, in obtaining a pass admitting him to the throne room. It is a modern and commodious apartment, with walls on three sides, and a door at one end. Opposite the door is the great white throne, which would perhaps appear monotonous to our terrestrial taste were it not for the sapphires which relieve the whiteness. The fourth wall is missing, thus affording an uninterrupted outlook upon space. By glancing downward and to the left, any one seated on the throne may obtain a commanding view of the created universe. Before the ceremony of the day began I had an opportunity, of which I did not hesitate to avail myself freely, to survey from this infinite height the various worlds below, as they went circling their suns and spinning, with a more private motion, each upon its own little axis. Turning again to the room after mastering this prospect, I noticed that except for the throne itself the only furniture was a gramophone, standing near the middle of the floor in a case of jasper.

Conversation with my guide was at this point rendered impossible by the opening of the door, and the entrance of a select yet representative delegation of the heavenly host, which for the most part dispersed itself about the room. One angel, however, took his stand near the gramophone and immediately busied himself with its mechanism. My guide, in answer to my discreet inquiry who this might be, looked surprised. "The Victor Recording Angel," of course," he whispered. "But hush! The ceremony begins." Turning toward the throne, which had been vacant a moment before, I saw the Lord of Creation seated upon it. I had not seen Him come in. Suddenly He was there.

After a little preliminary and melodious praise there was a short silence, which was broken by the Lord of Creation. "From all these competing spheres," He said, with a large gesture toward the universe beneath, "I can, by the aid of my all-seeing eye, select instantaneously, if I choose to do so, the successful candidate. For the moment I do not choose, preferring rather to subject each world in turn to an august scrutiny. By such concessions, made to the prejudices which flourish down there, does intuitive omniscience condescend to dress itself in the garments of that thing which perishable minds call reasoned judgment." He paused, and, after peering down on Creation a while, resumed the golden thread of his discourse: "This formality over, for by what other name shall we call a series of acts of which the only purpose can be to tell the Lord of Creation that which He knew already, and has known since the beginning of years, I proceed to deliver judgment. That one," He continued, pointing with an inerrant finger, "the one upon which the fruit of the tree of knowledge is science, and upon which for three years and a half the main business of science has been destruction and death, that is the worst world in the world."

At this point a lively little fellow, whom I had not noticed among those present, stepped forward into the vacant space near the throne. He was dressed in red, wore horns of an old-fashioned cut, and seemed eager to put in his word. He spoke vehemently with a strong German accent, about man, for whom he made the following apology:

Ein Wenig besser würd' er leben
Hättst du ihn nicht den Schein des Himmelslichts gegeben;
Er nennt's Vernunft und brauchst's allein
Nur tierisher als jedes Tier zu sein.

Upon the face of the Lord of Creation I seemed to detect an expression of extreme weariness, such as we see upon human faces when a story is related which was old when all its hearers were young. But the Lord, however bored He may have been, did not lay courtesy of manner aside. "It is well said, Mephistopheles," He began, while the little fellow glowed with pleasure, and even sent off a few sparks of the same. "It is well said. I remember thinking so the first time you said it, about a hundred years ago." When the laughter had subsided the Lord went on, in a sterner tone: "This transfer of hell to earth has not taught Mephistopheles any new wisdom. He learns nothing and forgets nothing—least of all his own words."

"Speaking of words," the Lord resumed, after watching Mephistopheles take refuge where the heavenly host was densest, "speaking of words reminds me." And He signalled to the Victor Recording Angel, at whose bidding the gramophone began its labors. The records seemed to have been exposed wherever and whenever, in the year 1917, human ineptitude and foolishness had spoken, yet this self-indictment of the human race, however painful to your and its representative, seemed not at all to touch the Lord of Creation. He listened tolerantly at first, as one accustomed to this sort of thing, and after a little His attention wandered. But on a sudden it came back. His countenance darkened and He said imperatively: "Repeat the last record."

These were the words uttered by the gramophone, whose German accent I thought positively indecent: "The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people has in the Lord of Creation an unconditional and avowed ally, on whom it can absolutely rely."

The heavenly host shuddered at the blasphemy and stood at gaze. "Who said this?" asked the Lord of Creation in a dangerous voice. "The Emperor William, Sire, in a speech to his second army on the French front, Saturday, December 22, 1917."

Mephistopheles, perceiving a chance still further to incense the Lord, came forward and raised his voice: "William's words, Sire, and it was very nice of him to express such an opinion, I must say." And he added, in what seems to be his favorite language:

Es ist gar hübsch von einem grossen Herrn
So menschlich von dem Gotte selbst zu sprechen.

On the Lord's cheek the flush of rage o'ercame the ashen hue of age. "And this of me?" He said. "Before the year 1918 is a year old—but I forget myself. Being slow to anger I will postpone my wrath until I have explained.

"Each man upon earth I have condemned to be born in another's pain and to die in his own. This statement is not literally true, but it is rhetorically, I think effective, besides being part of that system which I have followed in the natural world, where, in the laws of nature, which are my laws, I have put the case against my character for mercifulness more powerfully than any of my critics has ever put it. I send misery and destruction and death upon the just and the unjust. Men are at liberty to draw from this fact whatever inference they please, but woe unto those who draw the wrong inference.

"William has drawn the wrong inference. He has

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inferred that I am on his side. For years he has shown an increasing inclination to add a fourth party to a perfectly good Trinity. His words either mean that he is increasingly unable to distinguish between himself and me, or they mean nothing. This likeness does not exist. My worst enemies, even when they called me cruel, have seen nothing in my words which resemble either William's egotistic bluster or his arrogant whine.

"Let me quote an author who wrote in that language which is so often heard on the lips of Mephistopheles. It was Schopenhauer who said that the best man is he who makes least distinction between himself and other men. Possibly. But the assertion is by no means so indisputably true as this—that the worst and maddest man is he who sees the least difference between himself and the Lord of Creation."

He stopped for a moment, and then added, in a voice as clear as a winter sky, at sunset after a cloudless day, "William's punishment shall be to see himself, before he dies, as I see him. If he can then perceive any likeness between him and me, I shall be surprised. And this, as you all know, would for me be a new experience. The meeting is adjourned."

P. L.

Chicago

Chicago, by H. C. Chatfield-Taylor. Illustrations by Lester G. Hornby. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. $8.00.

A GOOD deal of nonsense is talked about the personality of towns. What most people enjoy about a town is familiarity, not personality, and they can give no penetrating account of their affection. "What is the finest town in the world?" the New York reporters recently asked a young recruit, eager for him to eulogize New York. "Why," he answered, "San Malo, France. I was born there." That is the usual reason, perhaps the best reason, why a person likes any place on earth. The clue is autobiographical.

But towns do have personality. Contrast London and New York, or Portland and Norfolk, or Madison and St. Augustine. Chicago certainly has a personality, and it would be obscurantism of the most modern kind to pretend that there was no "soul" in Chicago either to like or dislike. People who have never lived in Chicago are usually content with disliking it, and those who have seen it superficially, or smelled it in passing when the stockyard factories were making glue, can seldom understand why Chicagoans love it. Official visitors, of course, profess to admire it, with the eagerness of anxious missionaries seeking to make good with cannibals. But except for men who knew Bursley or Belfast and slipped into Chicago as into old slippers—men like Arnold Bennett and George Bermingham—there are few outsiders who really feel at home. Stevenson passed through it on his immigrant journey across the plains, pondering that one who had so promptly subscribed a sixpence to restore the city after the fire should be compelled to pay for his own ham and eggs. He thought Chicago great but gloomy. Kipling shrank from it like a sensitive plant. It horrified him. H. G. Wells thought it amazing, but chiefly amazing as a lapse from civilization. All of these leave little doubt how Chicago first hits the eye. It is, in fact, dirty, unruly and mean. It has size without spaciousness, opportunity without imaginativeness, action without climax, wealth without distinction. A sympathetic artist finds picturesqueness in it, though far from gracious where most characteristic, but for the most part it is shoddy, dingy and vulgar, making more noise downtown than a boiler works, and raining smuts all day as a symbolic reproach from heaven. It is not for its beaux yeux that the outsider begins to love the town.

But a great town is like the elephant of the fable, one must see it altogether before one can define it, one can believe almost anything monstrous from a partial view. Time, in the case of Chicago, is supremely necessary—about three years as a minimum. Then its goodness passeth all pre-matrimonial understanding, its essence is disclosed.

Mr. H. C. Chatfield-Taylor has qualified, so far as time is concerned, to speak of Chicago, and I think it would be churlish not to agree that from the standpoint of the old settler he has done his city proud. All old Chicagoans will recognize at once why Mr. Taylor should go back to the beginning, and they will be delighted at the clarity with which the early history is expounded, as well as the era before the Civil War. They will also understand and rejoice over the repetition of grand old names—Gordon S. Hubbard, John Kinzie, Mark Beaubien, Uranus H. Crosby, Sherman of the Sherman hotel, General Hart L. Stewart and Long John Wentworth. In every town in the world there is, of course, a Long John or a Big Bill, but Chicagoans will savor this reference to their own familiar, and will delight in the snug feeling that they too "knew Chicago when." Mr. Taylor is also dear to his townsmen when he harks to days before the Fire. In those days the West siders were a little superior because they had the Episcopal cathedral of Saints Peter and Paul, and the church-going folk could hear the "fast young men" speeding trotting horses past the church doors. Such performances seemed fairly worldly, but later did not Mr. Taylor himself drive his high-steppers to the races at Washington Park, and did he not woo the heart of the city where gilded youth cherished "a nod of recognition from Potter Palmer, John B. Drake, or John A. Rice." The dinners of antelope steak and roast buffalo at the Grand Pacific recall a Chicago antedating the World's Fair that left strong traces into the twentieth century, a Chicago that is commemorated with grace and kindliness in the fair pages of this book.

But this is not enough. If Mr. Taylor's heart lingers among the "marble-fronts" of his youth, this is not peculiarly Chicagoan. Such fond reminiscence is the common nature of man. And a better basis for loving Chicago must be offered than the evidence that one teethed on it, battered darling that it is. Mr. Taylor's better explanation, as I read it, is extremely significant. He identifies himself fully and eagerly with the New Englanders who made the town. Bounty-jumpers and squatters and speculators, war widows and politicians and anarchists and aliens—all these go into his perspective, as do the emergencies of the Fire and the splendors of the Fair. But the marrow of his pride in Chicago is his community with its origins in "men, like myself, of New England blood, whose fathers felled our forests and tilled our prairie land." Since the time he was born, he tells us, more than two million people have been added to the population of Chicago. Only a fifth of the Great West Side are now American-born, and the Lake Shore Drive was still a cemetery when Mr. Taylor was a boy on that dignified West Side. This links Mr. Taylor closely to the beginning of things. Hence he likes to insist in his kindly spirit that Chicago's puritan "aristocracy" is the source of Chicago altruism, that "the society of

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Chicago [is] more puritanical than that of any great city in the world," and that "back of Chicago's strenuousness and vim stands the spirit of her founders holding her in leash, the tenets of the Pilgrim Fathers being still a potent factor in her life . . . She possesses a New England conscience to leaven her diverse character and make her truly—the pulse of America."

Every bird takes what he finds to build his own spiritual nest. Personally, I love Chicago, ugly and wild and rude, but I prefer to see it as an impuritan. Its sprawling hideousness, indeed, has always seemed a direct result of the private-minded policy that distinguished Chicago's big little men. The triumvirate that Mr. Taylor mentions had no statesmanship in them. One was an admirable huckster, another an inflexible paternalist, the third a fine old philistine who carved a destiny in ham. But these men gave themselves and their city to business enterprise in its ugliest manifestation. The city of course has its remissions, its loveliness, but the incidental brutality of that enterprise is a main characteristic of the city, a characteristic barely suggested by Mr. Taylor, not clearly imagined by Mr. Hornby in his graceful drawings, so beautifully reproduced.

One should like, as a corrective to Mr. Taylor's pleasant picture, some leaves from Upton Sinclair's Jungle, Jack London's Iron Heel, Frank Norris's Pit, H. K. Webster's Great Adventure, the fiction of Edith Wyatt and Henry Fuller and Robert Herrick and Will Paine and Weber Linn and Sherwood Anderson, the poetry of Edgar Lee Masters and Carl Sandburg, the prose of Jane Addams. No one who looked at the City Council ten years ago, for example, can forget the brutality of that institution of collective life.

They called the old-time aldermen the "grey wolves." They looked like wolves, cold-eyed, grizzled, evil. They preyed on the city South side, West side, North side, making the shaky tenements and black brothels and sprawling immigrant-filled industries pay tribute in twenty ways. One night, curious to see Chicago at its worst, four of us went to a place that was glibly described as "the wickedest place in the world." It was a saloon under the West side elevated, and a room back of the saloon. At first it seemed merely dirty and meagre, with its runty Negro at the raucous piano. But at last the regular customers collected; the sots, the dead-beats, the human wreckage of both sexes, the woman of a fat pallor, the woman without a nose . . . They surrounded us, piled against us, clawed us. And that, in its way, is Chicago, Stead's Satanic vision of it revealed.

But the other side of that hideousness in Chicago is the thing one loves it for, the large freedom from caste and cant which is so much an essential of democracy, the cordiality which comes with fraternity, the access to men and life of all kinds. Chicago is a scrimmage but also an adventure, a frank and passionate creator struggling with hucksters and hogsters, a blundering friend to genius among the assassins of genius, a frontier against the Europe that meant an established order, an order of succession and a weary bread-line. In Chicago, for all its philistinism, there is the condition of hope that is half the spiritual battle, whatever stockades the puritans try to build. It is this that makes one lament the silences in Mr. Taylor's pleasant book. But the puritanical tradition requires silence. Polite and refined, self-centred and private-minded, attached to property and content within limitations, it made visible Chicago what it is.

F. H.

Where Trotzky Stands

The Bolsheviki and World Peace, by Leon Trotzky. New York: Boni & Liveright.

A PUBLISHER, no doubt, has a right to tempt the buyer by what title seems good to him, so long as his wares are actually valuable. The reader of this book of Trotzky's will find no mention in it of the Russian Bolsheviki, except in the preface by Lincoln Steffens. He will find nothing in the nature of an analysis of the actual Bolshevik peace terms. Instead, he will find an extremely vigorous polemic directed against the German Socialists and their acceptance of the policies of aggressive imperialism. Most of the book was written, apparently a year or more ago, when Trotzky was living in Switzerland. At that time he had no idea that Czarism was destined so soon to break down, nor did he dream that he was to play an important rôle in politics. It is no matter. The book presents a fair picture of the man, and illuminates the principles upon which his policy at Brest-Litovsk is based.

Somehow an impression has gained currency that Trotzky derives his doctrines rather from anarchism than from socialism; that he regards Russia, still unredeemed from primitive economic conditions, as a peculiarly favorable soil for the cultivation of socialistic forms; that he looks upon the war as the revolution's opportunity. This impression is false. Trotzky is orthodox Marxian in his evolutionary doctrine. The overthrow of Czarism by victorious Germany would not, in the view he expresses here, result in anything more than a temporary success for the revolution. And if the war is carried to the point of universal exhaustion of the belligerent states—a condition sufficiently favorable to anarchism—Trotzky sees that there would not be left in the proletariat forces capable of launching a new order. Somehow we had gained the impression that Trotzky cares little for the nationalistic strivings that find expression in this war. This impression also is false. He would dismember Austria-Hungary entirely, in sympathy with the aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs, Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Rumanians and Italians. He inveighs vigorously against "the cowardly and conservative efforts to maintain the Austro-Hungarian status quo." If "this Turkey of Central Europe" is allowed to survive, it will "delay the development of the Danube and Balkan peoples for more decades to come and make a repetition of the present war a practical certainty." Trotzky's internationalism is not based upon a negation of national aspirations, but upon their fulfilment.

We had also been led to believe that the moral case of the Allied party appeared no more valid to Trotzky than the Teutonic; that he regarded responsibility for the war as diffused generally over the capitalistic system. Not so: Trotzky even manages to extract from the German White Book evidence of German guilt that most of the critics of Germany had overlooked. Germany not only agreed to back up Austria-Hungary in her aggression against Serbia, but "actually made it a condition of the continuance of the alliance." The German Social Democrats allege that although surface indications make Germany the aggressor, there is a deeper logic that makes Germany the victim of aggression. It is worth quoting Trotzky's summary of the facts in the light of a logic deep enough for any German Social Democrat.

"From a *historical* standpoint the new German imperialism is, as we already know, absolutely aggressive. . . From the standpoint of *world politics,* the present moment

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seems to be the most favorable for Germany to deal her rivals a crushing blow. . . . The *diplomatic* view of events leaves no doubt concerning the leading part Germany played in Austria's provocative action in Serbia. . . . From the standpoint of *strategy,* the entire German campaign was based on a monstrous offensive. And finally, from the standpoint of *tactics,* the first move of the German army was the violation of Belgian neutrality. If all this is defense, then what *is* attack?"

Trotzky does not hold that the German Socialists should have resisted the government by meeting war with revolution. All the cards were in the government's hands, and resistance would have been futile. Besides, he recognizes defense as the duty of states. He does not even insist that the Social Democrats should have voted against the war credits. But they should have remained a party of opposition, preserving their moral integrity, resolved not to let the fate of any nation, whether their own or another, depend upon military success. They should steadily have stood for the principle that their working class interests would be placed in jeopardy as much by the annexation of alien provinces as by the loss of true German provinces to alien governments. Instead, they turned themselves over, body and soul, to the militarist government. Not one of their scores of newspapers protested against the violation of Belgium. Even their central organ, Vorwärts, stooped to petition for permission to exist, and appeared "By Order of Army Headquarters." It would have been far more honorable for the paper to have remained under interdiction, "than to continue to exist with the imprint of the general's boots on its forehead."

German socialism, Trotzky declares, is morally bankrupt. It has abandoned the class conflict and internationalism. Its nationalism is the nationalism of the middle class parties. In underwriting a war that is purely imperialistic in its origin and aims, German socialism has become a party of working class imperialism. Most of us have been puzzled by this evident apostasy of the Social Democracy from its true faith. In the preface of this book Lincoln Steffens explains it by the "sobering effect of responsibility." Trotzky has another explanation, and a more ingenious one. The Socialists fell from grace because of their espousal of opportunism, or minimalism. Instead of holding resolutely to their revolutionary purpose—maximalism, or Bolshevikism—they sought to gain for the working class concessions here and now. They devoted their energies to building up a powerful party organization, to creating a rich and varied press, to organizing coöperative effort, to working for labor legislation. Thus they acquired great vested interests that they were unwilling to jeopardize by placing themselves in opposition to the government in a time of national crisis.

Nor was this the worst consequence of minimalism. By working for their class advancement within the capitalistic organization, they unconsciously merged their interests with those of capitalism. So long as capitalism remained nationalistic, this did not bring them into conflict with the ideal of internationalism. But when German capitalism burst the national shell and went forth into the world under the banner of imperialism, minimalist socialism was forced tacitly to accept imperialism. Thus the German socialists have become part of the system that produced this war and will lead to other wars unless it is overthrown by revolution.

In this reasoning we have a clue to Trotzky's present policy. By meeting the aggressive designs of the Central Powers with words, not with armed force, he hopes to convey to the rank and file of German socialism a clear conception of the aggressive designs of their government. Their leaders are hopeless. They lost their spontaneity of mind and their integrity of purpose through the routine work of building up their cherished organization. Besides, they are men between fifty and sixty years of age. What Trotzky is trying to do is to work upon the fresher-minded rank and file, to oust their old leaders and constitute within Germany itself a party capable of opposing imperialism. Fundamentally, Trotzky conceives himself as the leader of a faction in the civil war of Europe, not as the representative of one state dealing with another. We wish Kuehlmann and Czernin joy of their negotiations with a man whose premises are so utterly foreign to theirs. They may conceivably be able to arrange a peace with Russia, but with what oaths will they bind the Social Revolution?

The Social Revolution, Trotzky warns, will not be bound by oaths. "Almost the entire adult male population is going through this school of war, so terrible in its realism, a school which is forming a new human type. Iron necessity is now shaking its fist at all the rules of bourgeois society, at its laws, its morality, its religion. 'Necessity knows no law,' said the German Chancellor on August 4th, . . . Governments repudiate their solemnly acknowledged obligations, and the national church ties its God to the national cannon like a criminal condemned to hard labor. Is it not clear that all these circumstances must bring about a profound change in the mental attitude of the working class, curing them radically of the hypnosis of legality? . . . 'Necessity knows no law,' the workers will cry when the attempt is made to hold them back at the command of bourgeois law."

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This is what the Germans dreaming of imperialistic profits have raised up against themselves on their eastern border. They may still be thinking of strategic frontiers. Where will they draw a strategic frontier against Bolshevikism?

A. J.

Recent Publications

My .75, by Paul Lintier. New York: George H. Doran Co. $1.35.

AMONGST the appalling number of war books My .75 stands out. Plainness of language and matter of fact descriptions go to make the book distinctive. The weariness and the shortlived excitement of the battle, and the horrors of the wounded lying in the fields are vividly presented. Throughout the book you feel that the desire to live is preëminent with the soldier. You feel, in reading, that the thoughts of all the soldiers are being expressed by this one; and you wish that the writer might have won relief and silence otherwise than through being wounded.

Housemates, by J. D. Beresford. New York: Geo. H. Doran & Co. $1.35.

MR. BERESFORD'S latest novel can be explained only as an interlude or breathing-space in the work of a novelist from whom we have come to expect almost nothing but the best. The hand of the craftsman continues to work, though the materials are of a quality so much thinner and cruder than those he customarily uses. Housemates has unmistakably the Beresford texture. There is the convincing accuracy of narration, that gift of the novelist for making you certain that all these events happened exactly as they are described. There is Mr. Beresford's absorption in the problems of the modern young man of no particular genius, meeting and blundering his way through the tangles of sex and the disheartenments of work. There is his usual grace of style, which touches off with vigor and yet subtlety the nuances of not quite competent youth. In Housemates there is even Mr. Beresford's favorite architect to remind us of Jacob Stahl. Yet this story never seems quite to reach the acme of significance. The hero, who tells the story, is singularly unsubstantial. We watch the process of the breaking-in of his "housemates" upon his narrowed and slightly obstinate life in the house at 73 Keppel Street, where he has set up his office. Nothing peculiarly significant happens to him, however, that pays us for the dramatic contacts upon which he reflects with so much sincerity. The various displaced and unfortunate people do not attain an individuality comparable to the fidelity of the narrative. The hero achieves an admirable if somewhat colorless wife. But neither the dramatic incident of the jealous friend, who offers herself to him, in order to save her loved Judith from him, nor the murder of the woman in the rooms above, serve to raise the story above tepidity. Yet it is an interesting theme, this of the breaking away of the young man from his conventional relatives to live in this house of drifting people and be caught into their schemes and passions and frustrations. Mr. Beresford, however, barely makes even the situation interesting. In characters like Jacob Stahl and Dick Lynneker, Mr. Beresford has succeeded in making mediocrity both significant and fascinating. In this young man, he scarcely does more than make it languidly intelligible.

Mr. George Jean Nathan Presents, by George Jean Nathan. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. $1.50.

THIS is a book of serious criticism of the New York theatre. Mr. Nathan is self-possessed, cynical, urbane, smart and sometimes flippant. He confounds one with his knowledge of the drama of the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. He gives us facts running over. For every assertion, for every rebuttal he marshals a company of facts that must convince all except the prejudiced. He loves to shatter legends. He seems to take the most malicious delight in those chapters wherein he shatters the legend of Mrs. Minnie Maddern Fiske's widely press-agented "intellectuality," and the legend of David Belasco's astuteness as a theatrical manager with a well developed art sense. He revolts at the "canonization of humbugs" in the game of the theatre; he holds up to ridicule the sensuality of plays based on the bible. He hates with a bitter hate the philistines whom he holds responsible for that false realism which is as much a transcription of life as a caricature is; for the commercial corruption of the theatre, for the seasonal crops of slushy, sentimental plays to which he characteristically refers as a fletcherization of the marshmallow. To the shallowness and vulgarity of Philistia which is, in the main, the supporter of the Broadway stage, he attributes the success of undeserving untrained actors and sensational playwrights. His book is refreshingly honest because refreshingly severe.

In the National Army Hopper, by Draftee No. 357. Philadelphia. J. B. Lippincott Co. 25 cents.

WAR in the air, on land and sea, and under the sea, has not lacked interpreters. Soldiers go over the top of book-covers almost every week, and publishers happily aid them for the American people will pay to find out what is going to happen to its relatives and friends. But it is, after all, just as anxious to know what is happening now, in the conscripted present of the drafted man. Where does he go and how does he change from civilian irregularity to military precision? How does he eat and sleep and amuse himself, and what, exactly, is "drill" and "mess" and "non-coms" and what makes up a "division?" Draftee No. 357 answers these and other questions in fifty-four small khaki-bound pages. It isn't a military catechism; it is his letters home, simple, humorous, informative, covering his career from the shedding of his oldest business suit to the achievement of corporal's stripes; the sort of letters one hopes for and never gets from relatives in camp. They make an interesting substitute.

Owing to the scarcity of paper, the Index for Volume XIII, which is completed with this number, has been printed separately. It will be mailed on request, post free, to any subscriber who will send his name and address on a post card directed to The New Republic, 421 West 21st Street, New York City.

Contributors

to this issue

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